Formal mutation testing for Circus by Alberto, A. et al.
This is an author produced version of Formal mutation testing for Circus.
White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/102815/
Article:
Alberto, A., Cavalcanti, A. L. C. orcid.org/0000-0002-0831-1976, Gaudel, M.-C. et al. (1 
more author) (2016) Formal mutation testing for Circus. Information and Software 
Technology. pp. 1-23. ISSN 0950-5849 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.infsof.2016.04.003
promoting access to
White Rose research papers
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/
Formal mutation testing for Circus
Alex Albertoa, Ana Cavalcantib, Marie-Claude Gaudelc, Adenilso Sima˜oa
aUniversidade de Sa˜o Paulo, ICMC, Sa˜o Carlos, Brazil
bUniversity of York, Department of Computer Science, York YO10 5GH, UK
cLRI, Universite´ de Paris-Sud and CNRS, Orsay 91405, France
Abstract
Context: The demand from industry for more dependable and scalable test-devel-
opment mechanisms has fostered the use of formal models to guide the generation
of tests. Despite many advancements having been obtained with state-based models,
such as Finite State Machines (FSMs) and Input/Output Transition Systems (IOTSs),
more advanced formalisms are required to specify large, state-rich, concurrent systems.
Circus, a state-rich process algebra combining Z, CSP and a refinement calculus, is
suitable for this; however, deriving tests from such models is accordingly more chal-
lenging. Recently, a testing theory has been stated for Circus, allowing the verification
of process refinement based on exhaustive test sets.
Objective: We investigate fault-based testing for refinement from Circus specifica-
tions using mutation. We seek the benefits of such techniques in test-set quality asser-
tion and fault-based test-case selection. We target results relevant not only for Circus,
but to any process algebra for refinement that combines CSP with a data language.
Method: We present a formal definition for fault-based test sets, extending the Circus
testing theory, and an extensive study of mutation operators for Circus. Using these
results, we propose an approach to generate tests to kill mutants. Finally, we explain
how prototype tool support can be obtained with the implementation of a mutant gen-
erator, a translator from Circus to CSP, and a refinement checker for CSP, and with a
more sophisticated chain of tools that support the use of symbolic tests.
Results: We formally characterise mutation testing for Circus, defining the exhaustive
test sets that can kill a given mutant. We also provide a technique to select tests from
these sets based on specification traces of the mutants. Finally, we present mutation
operators that consider faults related to both reactive and data manipulation behaviour.
Altogether, we define a new fault-based test-generation technique for Circus.
Conclusion: We conclude that mutation testing for Circus can truly aid making test
generation from state-rich model more tractable, by focussing on particular faults.
Keywords: Circus, mutation, testing, formal specification
1. Introduction
Testing from formal models is currently advancing as a solid approach to support
the growing demand from industry for more dependable and scalable test-development
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mechanisms. For instance, Model-Based Testing (MBT) benefits greatly from a precise
and clear semantics for models, as opposed to informal or semi-formal models whose5
semantics is dependent on the particular tool in use.
Many advancements have been obtained with state-based models, such as Finite
State Machines (FSMs) [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10] and Input/Output Transition Sys-
tems (IOTSs) [11, 12, 13, 14, 15]. Those models, however, quickly become intractable
when dealing with larger systems. Thus, more advanced formalisms are required to10
facilitate the specification of large, state-rich, concurrent systems.
Circus is a state-rich process algebra combining Z [16], CSP [17], and a refinement
calculus [18]. Its denotational and operational semantics are based on the Unifying
Theories of Programming (UTP) [19]. Circus can be used to verify large concurrent
systems, including those that cannot be handled by model checking. Circus has already15
been used to verify, for example, software in aerospace applications [20], and novel
virtualization software by the US Naval Research Laboratory [21].
A theory of testing for Circus [22], instantiating Gaudel’s long-standing theory of
formal testing [23, 24, 25], is available. It is founded on the Circus operational se-
mantics [26], described and justified in the UTP [27]. As usual in testing, it considers20
divergence-free processes for the model and the system under test. More precisely, if a
system under test diverges, since one cannot decide whether it is deadlocked or diver-
gent, divergence is assimilated to an unspecified deadlock and detected as a failure.
The Circus testing theory introduces potentially infinite (symbolic) exhaustive test
sets. To achieve practical usefulness, it is, therefore, mandatory to rely on selection25
criteria both to generate and to select a finite set of tests.
Test-case generation in model-based testing is guided by testing requirements that
should be met by a test suite. Usually, the requirements are either coverage criteria
that state which elements of the model should be traversed (covered) by test execution,
or fault models, which define specific faults that the test cases are supposed to reveal,30
if present in the system. These approaches are usually complementary to each other.
Coverage-based testing is proposed for Circus in [28]. It is worth investigating how
fault-based testing can complement the coverage testing.
Mutation testing is recognized as one of the most effective fault-detection tech-
niques [29]. The systematic injection of feasible modeling faults into specifications35
allows the prediction of potential defective implementations. The faults are seeded by
syntactic changes that may affect the observable specified behavior. Such faulty models
are “mutants”. A mutant is “killed” by a test case able to expose its observable behavior
difference. Testing can benefit from mutation in two ways [30]: some quality aspects
of a test set can be measured by the number of mutants it can kill, and the analysis of a40
mutant model allows the selection of tests targeting specific faults or fault classes.
In this paper, we introduce an approach to apply mutation testing to Circus specifi-
cations. Most of the presented mutation operators, that is, the fault-injection strategies,
are based on previous works that have tackled similar challenges in related modeling
languages [31, 32, 33]. The outcome of all mutation operators are, however, analyzed45
considering the specific features and particularities of Circus. Moreover, our results are
valid in the context of other process algebras, especially those based on CSP [34, 35].
The contribution of this paper is manifold. First, we instantiate the notions of
mutation testing for a state-rich concurrent language, namely, Circus, and its formal
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theory of testing. In particular, we face the challenge of associating mutations in the50
text of a Circus specification to traces of the Circus denotational semantics that define
tests that cover the mutation. Even though mutation testing has already been applied to
languages and theories upon which Circus is based, such as CSP [31] and the UTP [36],
the consideration of a state-rich process algebra for refinement with a UTP semantics
is novel. Second, we propose mutation operators for Circus, analysing and adapting55
existing ones for the underlying languages and designing some that are specific to
Circus. Third, we describe prototype tool support for the application of the mutant
operators and two approaches to generate tests that can kill these mutants. When it is
feasible to translate the considered Circus specification into CSP, we propose the use
of the FDR model checker. For the other cases, we identify a tool chain that copes60
directly with Circus specifications via slicing techniques and symbolic execution.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the aspects of
Circus and its testing theory that we use here. Section 3 extends the testing theory
to consider mutation testing and describes our approach to generating tests based on
mutants. The mutation operators used to generate the mutants themselves are defined65
in Section 4. Tool support for automation of our approach is discussed in Section 5,
and an extra complete example is introduced in Section 6. Finally, we present some
related and future work and conclusions in Sections 7 and 8.
2. Circus and its testing theory
In this section, we give a brief description of the Circus language, its operational70
semantics [26], and its testing theory [22].
2.1. Circus notation and operational semantics
As exemplified is Figure 1, Circus allows us to model systems and their compo-
nents via (a network of) interacting processes. In Figure 1, we define a single process
Chrono that specifies the reactive behaviour of a chronometer. This is a process that75
recognises tick events that mark the passage of time, a request to output the current
time via a channel time , and outputs minutes and seconds via a channel out .
A Circus specification is defined by a sequence of paragraphs. Roughly speaking,
they define processes, but also channels, and any types and functions used in the pro-
cess specifications. In Figure 1, we define a type RANGE , including the valid values80
for seconds and minutes, and the channels tick , time and out . The channel out is
typed, since it is used to communicate the current minutes and seconds recorded in the
chronometer as a pair. The final paragraph in Figure 1 defines Chrono itself.
Each process has:
a state and some operations for observing and changing it in a Z style. In Chrono, the85
state is composed by a pair AState of variables named sec andmin with integer
values between 0 and 59 (as defined by RANGE ), and the data operations on
this state are specified by the three schemas AInit , IncSec, IncMin .
actions that define communicating behaviours in a CSP style. The overall behaviour of
a process is specified by the main action after the symbol •. In our example, it is a90
3
RANGE == 0 . . 59
channel tick , time
channel out : RANGE × RANGE
process Chrono =̂ begin
state AState == [ sec,min : RANGE ]
AInit == [AState ′ | sec′ = min ′ ∧ min ′ = 0 ]
IncSec == [∆AState | sec′ = (sec + 1) mod 60 ∧ min ′ = min ]
IncMin == [∆AState | min ′ = (min + 1) mod 60 ∧ sec′ = sec ]
Run =̂ tick → IncSec; ((sec = 0) N IncMin)
@
((sec , 0) N Skip)
@
time → out !(min , sec)→ Skip
• (AInit ; (µ X • (Run; X )))
end
Figure 1: A Circus specification of a chronometer
sequential composition of the schema AInit followed by the repeated execution
of the Run action. The Circus construct µ X • A(X ) defines a recursive action
A, in which X is used for recursive calls.
The initialisation schema AInit defines the values sec′ and min ′ of the state com-
ponents after the initialisation. These components are declared using AState ′. The95
operation schemas IncSec and IncMin change the state, as indicated by the declara-
tion ∆AState . They also define values sec′ and min ′ of the state components after the
operations. In each case, the seconds and minutes are incremented modulo 60.
Run starts with an external choice (@) between the events tick and time . If the en-
vironment chooses the event tick , this is followed by the increment of the chronometer100
using the data operation IncSec. Afterwards, we have another choice between ac-
tions guarded by the conditions sec = 0 and sec , 0. If, after the increment, we
have sec = 0, then the minutes are incremented using IncMin . Otherwise, the ac-
tion terminates (Skip). If the event time occurs, then the values of min and sec are
displayed (output), using the channel out , before termination.105
Circus comes with a denotational and an operational semantics, based on Hoare
and He’s Unifying Theories of Programming (UTP) [19], and a notion of refinement.
We can use Circus to write abstract as well as more concrete specifications, or even
programs. A full account of Circus and its denotational semantics is given in [37].
The operational semantics [26] plays an essential role on the definition of testing110
strategies based on Circus specifications. It is briefly introduced below, and a signif-
icant part is reproduced in Appendix A. It is defined as a symbolic labelled transition
system between configurations. These are triples (c | s |= A), with a constraint c, a
state s, and a continuation A, which is a Circus action. Transitions associate two con-
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c ∧ T , ∅ x < αs
(c | s |= d?x : T→ A)
d?w0
−→ (c ∧ w0 ∈ T | s; var x := w0 |= let x • A)
c ∧ (s; g)
(c | s |= g N A)
ǫ
−→ (c ∧ (s; g) | s |= A)
Figure 2: Examples of two transition rules: for inputs, and for guards
figurations and a label. The labels are either empty, represented by ǫ, or symbolic115
communications of the form c?w or c!w, where c is a channel name and w is a symbolic
variable that represents an input (?) or an output (!) value.
The first component c of a configuration (c | s |= A) is a constraint over symbolic
variables that are used to define labels and the state. The constraints are texts that
denote Circus predicates over these symbolic variables. We use typewriter font for120
pieces of text. For example, x := w0 is the text that describes an assignment of a value
represented by a symbolic variable w0 to the variable x . On the other hand, x := w0 is
the predicative relation that defines the meaning of x := w0. The distinction is important
in the operational semantics, which manipulates pieces of text to define constraints.
The second component s is a UTP predicate, which defines a total assignment125
x := w of symbolic variables w to all variables x in scope, including the state compo-
nents. State assignments, however, can also include declarations and undeclarations of
variables using the constructs var x := e and end x. The state assignments define a
value for all variables in scope. These values are represented by symbolic variables
similarly to what is classically done in symbolic execution of programs [38].130
Two examples of rules are given in Figure 2. The first rule defines the transitions
arising from an input prefixing d?x : T→ A; it is rule (A.3) of Appendix A. The label
of the transition is d?w0, where w0 is a symbolic variable. The constraint that w0 is of
the right type (w0 ∈ T) is added to the constraint of the new configuration. The state
of the new configuration is enriched, via the UTP sequence operator “; ”, by a new135
component x , which is assigned value w0. The continuation of the new configuration
is the action A in an environment enriched by x as defined by let x • A.
The second rule of Figure 2 defines the transitions arising from a guarded action
g & A. The label of such a transition is empty, since the evaluation of g is not an
observable event; g is added to the constraint of the new configuration taking into140
account the assignments in the current state s . The continuation is A.
Traces of a process are defined in the usual way, that is, as sequences of observ-
able events. Due to the symbolic nature of configurations and labels, however, we
can obtain from the operational semantics constrained symbolic traces, or cstraces,
for short. These are pairs formed by a sequence of labels, that is, a symbolic trace,145
and a constraint over the symbolic variables used in the labels. Roughly speaking,
the constrained symbolic trace can be obtained by evaluating the operational seman-
tics, collecting the labels together, and accumulating the constraints over the symbolic
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cst1 :(〈tick〉, true)
cst2 :(〈time , out!α0!α1〉, α0 = 0 ∧ α1 = 0)
cst3 :(〈tick , time , out!α0!α1〉, α0 = 0 ∧ α1 = 1)
cst4 :(〈tick〉60, true)
cst5 :(〈tick〉60 a 〈time , out!α0!α1〉, α0 = 1 ∧ α1 = 0)
Figure 3: Some constrained symbolic traces for Chrono
variables used in the labels. Figure 3 gives some examples of cstraces of Chrono.
A trace is an instantiation of a cstrace, where the symbolic variables used in the150
labels are replaced by values satisfying the constraint. For instance, the two traces
〈time , out!0!0〉 and 〈tick , time , out!0!1〉 are instances of cst2 and cst3.
2.2. Testing in Circus
Gaudel’s long-standing testing theory [23] has been instantiated for Circus in [22].
The conformance relation considered in that work is process refinement: the UTP no-155
tion of refinement applied to state-rich processes.
As previously explained, the Circus testing theory takes the view that, in specifica-
tions, divergences are mistakes. In addition, since in a system under test (SUT), they
are observed as deadlocks, altogether the results in [22] consider divergence-free spec-
ifications and SUT. For divergence-free models, the Circus refinement relation can be160
characterized by the conjunction of traces-refinement and the well known conf rela-
tion, as defined in [39], that requires reduction of deadlocks. This is proved in [40].
Accordingly, [22] defines separate exhaustive test sets for traces refinement and
conf , namely ExhaustT (SP ) and Exhaustconf (SP ), which we briefly present here.
A test for traces refinement is constructed by considering a trace of the Circus165
specification and one of the events that cannot be used to extend that trace to obtain a
new trace of the Circus specification [41]. Such events are called the forbidden con-
tinuations of the trace. For a specification SP , the exhaustive test set ExhaustT (SP )
includes all the tests formed by considering all the traces and all their forbidden con-
tinuations and inserting some special verdict events, as explained below.170
For a finite trace s = 〈a1, a2, . . . , an 〉 and an event (forbidden continuation) a , we
define the test process TT (s , a) as follows:
TT (s , a) = inc → a1 → inc → a2 → inc . . . an → pass → a → fail → STOP
Extra special events inc, pass and fail are used to indicate a verdict. In the execution
of a testing experiment, the test is run in parallel with the SUT and the last special event
observed in a testing experiment provides the verdict. Due the possibility of nondeter-175
minism, the submitted trace of the Circus specification is not necessarily performed by
the SUT. The inc event indicates an inconclusive verdict: the SUT has not performed
the proposed trace. If it does perform the trace, a pass event is observed, but if the SUT
proceeds to engage in the forbidden continuation a , then there is a fail event.
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Example 1. For instance, a possible test of Chrono, based on the trace 〈tick , time〉180
and the forbidden continuation out .0.0 is:
inc→ tick → inc→ time → pass → out .0.0→ fail → Stop

This leads to the following definition of the exhaustive test set for traces refinement:
ExhaustT (SP ) = {TT (s , a) | s ∈ traces(SP ) ∧ s
a 〈a〉 < traces(SP ) }
The exhaustivity, that is, the equivalence of traces refinement to the absence of fail
verdict when running all the tests of ExhaustT (SP ), is proved in [41] and [22] under185
– as usual in theoretical approaches to testing in the presence of nondeterminism –
the complete testing assumption [42]: when a test experiment is performed a sufficient
number of times all possible (nondeterministic) behaviours of the SUT are observed.
Traces and forbidden continuations are characterised symbolically leading to the
definition of SExhaustT (SP ), an exhaustive set of symbolic tests based on cstraces190
and constrained symbolic forbidden continuations.
Example 2. An example of such a symbolic test for Chrono, based on the cstrace
(〈tick , time〉, true) and the forbidden constrained symbolic continuation defined as
out .α0.α1 : (¬(α0 = 0 ∧ α1 = 1)) is as follows:
inc→ tick : true → inc→ time : true → pass
→out .α0.α1 : (¬(α0 = 0 ∧ α1 = 1))→ fail → Stop
195
In [22] it is proved that ExhaustT (SP ) corresponds to all the tests that are valid in-
stances (that is, that satisfy the constraints) of some symbolic test in SExhaustT (SP ).
The conf relation captures reduction of deadlock. Given SP1 and SP2, we have
that SP1 conf SP2 if, and only if, whenever SP2 engages in a sequence of events, that
is, a trace that can be accepted by SP1 as well, then SP2 can only deadlock if SP1 may200
as well. Formally, conf can be defined as follows:
SP2 conf SP1 =̂ ∀ t : traces(SP1) ∩ traces(SP2) • Ref (SP2, t) ⊆ Ref (SP1, t)
where Ref (SP , t) =̂ {X | (t ,X ) ∈ failures(SP ) }
For a trace t of a process P and a subset X = {a1, . . . , an } of the set of events of P ,
noted αP , the pair (t ,X ) belongs to failures(P ) if, and only if, after performing t ,
P may refuse all events of X . In other words, the parallel composition below may
deadlock just after t . We use proc(t) to represent a Circus process that accepts just the
execution of t before finishing; it can be defined using prefixing, for example.
P J αP K (proc(t); (a1 → P1 @ . . . @ an → Pn ))
P J αP KQ is the parallel composition of the processes P and Q with synchronisation
required on all the events of P , that is, the events in the set αP .
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Thus, given a system under test SUT and a specification SP , for SUT conf SP to
hold, the definition requires that, after performing every one of their common traces,205
the failures of SUT are failures of SP . Consequently, after a trace t of SP , SUT
may refuse all events refused by SP or accept some of them. Testing for conf based
on the refusals of SP would be, therefore, useless. What must be tested is that, after
every trace t of SP , SUT cannot refuse all events in a set X of events such that
(t ,X ) < failures(SP ). Such sets of events are called acceptance sets of SP after t .210
Thus, tests for conf are based on traces and acceptance sets. For a finite trace
s = 〈a1, a2, . . . , an 〉 and a(n acceptance) set X = {x1, . . . , xm } of events, we define the
Circus test process TF (s ,X ) as shown below.
TF (s ,X ) = inc → a1 → inc → a2 → inc . . . an → fail
→ (x1 → pass → Stop @ . . . @ xm → pass → Stop)
Example 3. An example of such a test for Chrono, based on trace 〈tick〉 and on the215
acceptance set {tick , time} is:
TF (〈tick〉, {tick , time}) = inc → tick → fail
→ (tick → pass → Stop @ time → pass → Stop)

An exhaustive test set of a specification SP for conf is made of all tests formed by
considering all traces of SP , and all the acceptance sets after each of them:
{TF (t ,X ) | t ∈ traces(SP ) ∧ (t ,X ) < failures(SP ) }
Actually Exhaustconf ( SP ) is defined as a subset of the set above where only minimal220
acceptance sets are considered, since as soon as some event in a set X is accepted after
a trace, any set containing X is an acceptance set after this trace. For instance, the test
in Example 3 is not in Exhaustconf (Chrono), but the two tests below are:
TF (〈tick〉, {tick }) = inc → tick → fail → (tick → pass → Stop)
TF (〈tick〉, {time}) = inc → tick → fail → (time → pass → Stop)
The symbolic counterpart of Exhaustconf ( SP ) is SExhaustconf (SP ), defined in [22].
SExhaustT (SP ) and SExhaustconf (SP ) provide bases for defining strategies for225
test selection as definitions of subsets of ExhaustT (SP ) and Exhaustconf (SP ) via
uniformity or regularity hypotheses [23] and adequate instantiations [22], or coverage
criteria of the specification [28]. This paper addresses fault-based selection techniques.
The Circus testing theory for traces refinement can be seen as a fault-based testing
approach, because tests are constructed from (minimal) invalid traces. The fault consid-230
ered in a particular test is very specific: a single forbidden continuation; the exhaustive
test set considers all such possible faults. The theory for conf testing considers other
specific faults, namely refusals of the SUT that are not specified.
A practical question regards the use of more elaborated fault models. This is studied
in the next section, and mutation operators are presented in Section 4.235
8
3. Mutation testing in Circus
We assume that there is a specification (model), which is a Circus process that de-
scribes what the implementation should do. A mutant is also a Circus process, some-
how related to the original specification; it represents a fault in that specification. In
what follows, we may also refer to mutants as faulty models. In general, given a mutant240
defined as a Circus process, it can be used to generate tests to identify the fault it rep-
resents, that is, to “kill the mutant”. We apply the approach in [36] by Aichernig at al.
for mutation testing based on refinement, but consider the particular case of state-rich
process algebraic models, and Circus in particular.
A mutant FM is of interest if there exists at least one test that can kill it. This is not245
the case if it is a refinement of the specification. This is the counterpart at the model
level of the well known problem of equivalent mutants at the program level. In such a
case, the mutant is not a faulty model and so not relevant.
In Section 3.1 we formalise mutation testing when traces refinement is the confor-
mance relation of interest. Section 3.2 presents an example: a mutant and the tests they250
generate. Section 3.3 considers mutation when testing against the conf conformance
relation. Finally, in Section 3.4, we introduce a new kind of trace, closer to the text of
the specification, to relate tests and mutation points in the specification.
3.1. Killing faulty models against traces refinement
In the context of traces refinement, we consider a faulty model FM to be of interest255
if it is not a traces refinement of the specification model SP . In this case, there is at
least one trace of FM that is not a trace of SP ; this is not the empty trace 〈〉, because
〈〉 is a trace of all processes. To detect the fault in FM , we can use a test TT (s , a)
characterised by any of the minimal traces s a 〈a〉 of FM that are not traces of S .
Formally, we define the set FBTestsSP
T
(FM ) of fault-based tests characterised by FM260
with respect to a specification SP as shown below.
Definition 1.
FBTestsSP
T
(FM ) =
{s : traces(SP ); a : Σ | s a 〈a〉 ∈ traces(FM ) \ traces(SP ) • TT (s , a) }
This is the set of all tests TT (s , a), formed from traces s of SP and events a from
Σ such that s a 〈a〉 is a trace of FM , but not of SP . A mutant FM is killed by
any test from FBTestsSP
T
(FM ). As a direct consequence of its definition, we have that
FBTestsSP
T
(FM ) is a subset of ExhaustT (SP ), since it contains tests TT (s , a), where265
s ∈ traces(SP ) and s a 〈a〉 < traces(SP ).
Before generating tests based on a mutant FM , a first step is the confirmation that
it is not a traces refinement of the model SP . For that, it is of value to use a refinement
model checker, like FDR [43] for CSP, for example, to check SP ⊑T FM . If this does
not hold, FDR provides a counterexample: a minimal trace of FM that is not a trace of270
SP . As said above, this identifies a test to detect the fault specified in FM .
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process MutatedChrono =̂
...
Run =̂ (tick → IncSec; (¬ (sec = 0) N IncMin)
@((sec , 0) N Skip)))
@(time → out !(min , sec)→ Skip)
• (AInit ; (µ X • (Run; X )))
...
Figure 4: a mutated chronometer
3.2. A first mutant of Chrono and some tests that kill it
Figure 2 presents the mutant MutatedChrono of the Chrono process, which is
obtained by the introduction of the negation (¬ ) operator in the first guard of the ac-
tion Run . The following change in behavior arises from this mutation: like Chrono,275
MutatedChrono starts with the AInit operation that initialises min and sec to 0 and,
after a tick , IncSec increases the value of sec to 1; afterwards, however, the mutant
behaves nondeterministically, either likeChrono, that is, executing Skip and thenRun
again, or performing IncMin and then Run again, like Chrono in the case sec = 0.
This erroneously leads to a state where min = 1 and sec = 1. This mutated state can280
be later observed via an output on the channel out following a time event.
Thus 〈tick , time , out!(1, 1)〉 is a trace ofMutatedChrono, but not of Chrono, for
which the only accepted event after 〈tick , time〉 is out!(0, 1). As seen above such
traces define tests that kill the mutant. An example is the test below:
inc→ tick → inc→ time → pass → out!(1, 1)→ fail → Stop
It is a member of FBTestsChrono
T
(MutatedChrono).
Actually, this test may kill the mutant since it is nondeterministic due to the overlap
of the guards in the choice operator (for the distinction between “may kill” and “must
kill”, see [44]). The test kills the mutant under the complete testing assumption.285
3.3. Killing faulty models against the conf conformance relation
Given a mutant FM , it is of interest if ¬ (FM conf SP ). In this case, there is at
least one common trace s of SP and FM for which ¬ (Ref (FM , s) ⊆ Ref (SP , s)).
Therefore, according to the definition of Ref (P , s), there is at least one set of events
X such that (s ,X ) ∈ failures(FM ), but (s ,X ) < failures(SP ).290
The detection of the fault specified in FM with respect to conf is based on tests
TF (s ,X ) characterized by (s ,X ) ∈ failures(FM ), where (s ,X ) < failures(SP ), and
s is a trace s of SP and FM . The full set FBTestsSP
F
(FM ) of fault-based tests for
conf characterized by FM with respect to SP is defined as follows.
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Definition 2.
FBTestsSP
F
(FM ) =
{s : traces(SP ) ∩ traces(FM ); X : PΣ |
(s ,X ) ∈ failures(FM ) \ failures(SP ) • TF (s ,X ) }
As a direct consequence of the above definition, we have that FBTestsSP
F
(FM ) is a295
subset of Exhaustconf (SP ), since it contains tests TF (s ,X ), where s ∈ traces(SP )
and (s ,X ) < failures(SP ). In words, X is an acceptance set of SP after s .
Theorem 1. For every mutant FM of a specification SP , the following statements are
equivalent:
1. FM is of interest; and300
2. FBTestsSP
T
(FM ) , ∅ ∨ FBTestsSP
F
(FM ) , ∅.
Proof. If FM is of interest, it is not a refinement of SP , that is, either it is not a traces
refinement of SP , or it does not satisfy FM conf SP .
In the first case, as shown in [22], there exists some T ∈ ExhaustT (SP ) such that
its execution against FM yields a fail verdict. By definition of ExhaustT (SP ), there305
are s and a , such thatT = TT (s , a) and s ∈ traces(SP ) ∧ s
a〈a〉 < traces(SP ). From
the definition ofTT (s , a), since the fail event is reached, s
a〈a〉 is a trace ofFM . Thus,
from Definition 1, T belongs to FBTestsSP
T
(FM ), and so FBTestsSP
T
(FM ) , ∅.
With a similar argument, the second case implies FBTestsSP
F
(FM ) , ∅.
Conversely, if FBTestsSP
T
(FM ) , ∅, there exists some T = TT (s , a), where310
s ∈ traces(SP ) and s a 〈a〉 ∈ traces(FM ) \ traces(SP ). T belongs to ExhaustT (SP )
and by construction yields a fail verdict when executed against FM . Therefore, from
the exhaustivity result of [22], FM is not a traces refinement of SP .
The proof that FBTestsSP
F
(FM ) , ∅ implies that ¬ FM conf SP is similar. 
In Theorem 1, we formalise the previously introduced notion of mutants of interest: a315
mutant is of interest if its fault can be exposed by, at least, a test.
Example 4. Coming back to MutatedChrono, another change of behavior is that it
introduces a deadlock. When the mutated external choice is reached in a state where
sec = 0, because all the possible choices are guarded by the negation of this condition,
there is a deadlock. Due to the equation sec′ = (sec +1)mod 60 in the IncSec schema,320
it occurs after sixty tick events. After such a trace, Chrono must accept one more tick
event, or one time event, but the mutated specification refuses both. This leads to the
following tests, each of them killing the mutant under the complete testing assumption.
(inc→ tick )60 → fail → tick → pass → Stop
(inc→ tick )60 → fail → time → pass → Stop
We use (inc → tick )60 to denote a prefixing action where the events inc and tick are
offered in alternation, starting with inc, 60 times. 325
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When generating tests based on given a mutant FM , a first step is the confirmation
that it is a traces refinement, but not a failures refinement of SP . If we can use a
refinement model checker, we can check SP ⊑T FM , and then use the counterexample
for SP ⊑F FM . In the case of FDR, for example, the counterexample is a minimal set
of acceptances of FM that is not a set of acceptances of SP . Alternatively, it gives a330
set of refusals of FM that is not a set of refusals of SP . It is this set of refusals that can
be directly used to define a test to detect the fault specified in FM .
In our framework, a set of mutantsM of SP defines a set
TM
T
=̂ {M • FBTestsSP
T
(M )}
of subsets of ExhaustT (SP ) and a set
TM
F
=̂ {M • FBTestsSP
F
(FM )}
of subsets of Exhaustconf (SP ). Therefore, M is the basis of a test selection method335
in the sense of [22]. Besides, given a test suite T , it is adequate for M if, for each
m ∈ M , T ∩ FBTestsSP
T
(m) , ∅ or T ∩ FBTestsSP
F
(m) , ∅. From Lemma 1, we
know that for a setM of mutants of interest, there is always an adequate test suite.
3.4. Specification traces and mutation points
Mutations are related to the text of a specification. Traces and even constrained340
symbolic traces, however, are not related to the text of the specification. They record
a possible history of interactions, and it may well be the case that, in some specific
situations, we can relate interactions to events and communications in the text of spec-
ification. On the other hand, but there is no record of guards and data operations that
may have been evaluated or executed in the path to that interaction.345
As an example, we consider the constrained symbolic trace cst3 in Figure 3. Since
there is only one communication via out in the text of Chrono, in this special case, we
can relate out!α0!α1 to the anti-penultimate line of its definition. On the other hand,
cst3 has no record of AInit and IncSec, and of the guards sec = 0 and sec , 0, which
are considered in the path to that interaction and may be the object of a mutation.350
Therefore, we use specification traces, as defined in [45, 28], to build the tests
aimed at killing a mutant. In [28], specification traces are used to consider data-flow
coverage, which is also based on the text of a specification. While cstraces are useful
for trace selection based on constraints on the traces, they do not support selection
based on the text of the specification, as we explain in the sequel.355
In specification traces, labels are pieces of the specification: guards (predicates),
communications, data operations (schemas) or simple Circus actions. In case there
are repetitions of identical text pieces in the Circus specification, different occurrences
are distinguished in the labels using textual tags. The syntactic category of Labels is
defined in Figure 5; the sets Pred , Exp, CName , VName , and Schema are those of360
the Circus predicates, expressions, channel and variable names, and Z schemas [46].
In Figure 6, we present two rules of the transition system that characterises specifi-
cation traces. These transition rules correspond to those for the operational semantics
shown in Figure 2. We note that, the same notion of configuration is used and the tran-
sitions are the same, except for the labels. For instance, for an input, the label d?w0365
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Label ::= Pred | Comm | LAct
Comm ::= ǫ | CName | CName!Exp | CName?VName
| CName?VName : Pred
LAct ::= VName∗ : [Pred ,Pred ] | Schema | VName := Exp
| var VName : Exp | var VName := Exp | end VName
Figure 5: Syntax of specification labels.
c ∧ T , ∅ x < αs
(c | s |= d?x : T→ A)
d?x
=⇒ (c ∧ w0 ∈ T | s; var x := w0 |= let x • A)
(1)
c ∧ (s; g)
(c | s |= g N A)
g
=⇒P (c ∧ (s; g) | s |= A)
(2)
Figure 6: Transition rules that define specification traces
in the operational semantics uses a symbolic variable w0, while in the specification
traces it refers to the variable x used in the specification. Moreover, the transition for a
guarded action g NA is no longer unlabelled, but records the guard g .
In Figures 7 and 8, we list some specification traces for the processes Chrono and
MutatedChrono. The use of text pieces from the specifications in labels allows the370
identification and selection of traces that reach textual constructs affected by mutation.
Remark. In [28], a subset of specification traces, sptraces, is considered for the def-
inition of tests satisfying data-flow coverage criteria, namely, the set of specification
traces where the last event is an observable event. Some of the specification traces
given in Figures 7 and 8 are not sptraces. It is the case of spect1 and spect ′1, and of375
all the traces in Setspect ′5. The specification traces in this last set, for example, are of
great interest since they lead to a deadlock that is not in the original specification, and
thus provide bases for obtaining tests of FBTestsChrono
F
(MutatedChrono). 
Converting a specification trace to a cstrace requires the definition of an operational380
semantics for labels. Figure 9 presents its transition rules for input and guard labels.
We refer to Figure 2 for the corresponding rules of the operational semantics. Like in
the operational semantics, the configuration is a triple, but here, instead of a process or
action, there is a label associated with a constraint and a state assignment. Labels with
no guard, but with an input or output communication, are handled in the same way as385
input and output prefixes in the operational semantics. When there is a label (g, e, A),
with a guard that may be different from True, if the guard holds in the current state
then there is a transition to a label (e, A) with guard True, or no guard, for short. The
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spect1 : 〈AInit, tick , IncSec, (sec , 0)〉
spect2 : 〈AInit, time , out!min!sec〉
spect3 : 〈AInit, tick , IncSec, (sec , 0), time , out!min!sec〉
spect4 : 〈AInit〉 a 〈tick , IncSec, (sec , 0)〉59 a 〈tick , IncSec, (sec = 0), IncMin〉
spect5 : 〈AInit〉 a 〈tick , IncSec, (sec , 0)〉59a
〈tick , IncSec, (sec = 0), IncMin , time , out!min!sec〉
Figure 7: Some specification traces for Chrono
spect ′1 :〈AInit , tick , IncSec,¬ (sec = 0), IncMin〉
spect ′2 :〈AInit , time , out!min!sec〉
spect ′3 :〈AInit , tick , IncSec, (sec , 0), time , out!min!sec〉
spect ′4 :〈AInit , tick , IncSec,¬ (sec = 0), IncMin , time , out!min!sec〉
Setspect ′5 :〈AInit , tick , IncSec〉a
(〈¬ (sec = 0), IncMin , tick , IncSec〉 | 〈(sec , 0), tick , IncSec〉)59
[deadlock ]
Figure 8: Some specification traces forMutatedChrono
transition is unlabelled, like in the operational semantics.
The similarity between the operational semantics of labels and of Circus is not390
surprising. Conversion of specification traces (of labels) to a cstrace recovers the oper-
ational semantics of the Circus texts captured in the specification traces.
In Figures 3 and 10 we give the constrained symbolic traces converted from those
specification traces listed in Figures 7 and 8. The trace cst ′4 is that used in Section 3.2
as a basis for the first test that kills MutatedChrono. The trace cst ′5 is the unique395
translation of all the traces in Setspect ′5; it is the basis of the two other killer tests given
in Section 3.2. The conversion procedure of sptraces into cstraces is given in [28] and
trivially generalises to specification traces. As seen above, several specification traces
may correspond to the same cstrace. This follows from the fact that cstraces record
only observable symbolic events, while specification traces record internal events and400
may distinguish different ways of enchaining the same observable events.
To summarise, in considering mutation testing in Circus we use three kinds of
traces: specification traces, cstraces, and standard traces. We perform the selection
among specification traces and then generate from those some killer tests belonging
to FBTestsSP
T
(FM ) and FBTestsSP
F
(FM ), which are defined as sets of concrete tests405
based on standard traces. Since the operational semantics defines the traces of a speci-
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c ∧ (s; g)
(c | s |= (g, e, A))
ǫ
−→ (c ∧ (s; g) | s |= (e, A))
c ∧ T , ∅
(c | s |= (d?x : T, A))
d?w0
−→ (c ∧ w0 ∈ T) | s; var x := w0 |= let x • A)
Figure 9: Operational semantics of labels
cst ′1 :(〈tick〉, true)
cst ′2 :(〈time , out!α0!α1〉, α0 = 0 ∧ α1 = 0)
cst ′3 :(〈tick , time , out!α0!α1〉, α0 = 0 ∧ α1 = 1)
cst ′4 :(〈tick , time , out!α0!α1〉, α0 = 1 ∧ α1 = 1)
cst ′5 :(〈tick〉60, true) [deadlock ]
Figure 10: Constrained symbolic traces forMutatedChrono
fication as cstraces, there is an intermediate form of the tests based on cstraces, that is,
symbolic killer tests, that need to be adequately instantiated into some concrete tests.
We must take into account that a specification trace corresponds to one cstrace, but
that several specification traces may correspond to the same cstrace, as seen above, and410
that a specification trace of FM that is not a specification trace of SP may lead to a
cstrace that is the translation of another specification trace of SP . Given a mutant FM
of SP , we define a notion of relevant specification trace of FM .
Definition 3. Given a specification SP and a faulty model FM obtained by mutation
of SP , a specification trace of FM is relevant if:415
• it is not a specification trace of SP and its conversion into a cstrace is not a
cstrace of SP , or
• one of the instantiations of its conversion into a cstrace is part of some failure of
FM that is not a failure of SP .
The first case is the starting point for obtaining some tests in FBTestsSP
T
(FM ) and the420
second case for some tests in FBTestsSP
F
(FM ).
To determine whether a specification trace of FM is relevant, we need to compare
its cstrace to those of SP . We note that in the Circus testing theory, we use unique (up
to predicate equivalence) symbolic representatives of these traces using a fixed ordered
alphabet of symbolic variables. That allows a uniform account of these traces, and425
simplifies the management of names by avoiding renaming complications.
If there are no relevant specification traces of FM , it means that there exist no test
for killing FM , that is, the effect of the mutation is not observable, neither for traces,
nor for failures. FM is a refinement of SP and is not a mutant of interest.
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The existence of non-relevant mutated specification traces is due to the possibility430
of specifying systems in an abstract way, with hidden operations on some state: the con-
sequences of a mutation of such operations may not be observable. This phenomenon
is not specific to Circus and similar issues are likely to occur in model-based mutation
testing as soon as there is a significant abstraction gap between the model and the SUT.
It is very likely that some mutations affecting the hidden state can be identified as435
prone to producing non-relevant specification traces, and then avoided in a particular
test-selection heuristic. These points are the subject of future work.
In conclusion, given a mutation of a Circus specification, the principle of the test-
generation process that we propose is as follows:
1. Select a specification trace spect of FM that reaches the mutation point;440
2. Convert it into its corresponding cstrace cst ;
3. Check whether cst is a cstrace of SP ;
4. If not, instantiate cst into a concrete trace and build the corresponding tests of
FBTestsSP
T
(FM ) as defined in Section 3.1;
5. Check whether some instantiations of cst leads to failures that are not failures445
of SP and build the corresponding tests of FBTestsSP
F
(FM ), as defined in Sec-
tion 3.3.
We discuss in Section 5 some tools to support this process. First, in the next section,
we present operators to produce mutants.
4. Mutation operators450
A mutation operator Op is a function that generates a set of mutants for a given
specification SP . In each mutant in Op(SP ), one fault is inserted. Such an operator
only yields well-typed, syntactically correct, mutants. A mutation operator is valid for
a specification, if it generates at least one mutant of interest.
In this section, we present a list of mutation operators for Circus. Many of the455
mutation operators of CSP presented in [31] by Srivatanakul et al. are directly appli-
cable to Circus. These are discussed in Section 4.1. For the data and state aspects of
Circus, we can benefit from some mutation operators based on fault classes for predi-
cates, like those presented by Kuhn in [32] and enriched by Black et al. in [33]. These
are discussed in Section 4.2. We need to take into consideration, however, the specific460
features and particularities of our target language, Circus.
4.1. Modification of behavioural operators
Three classes of mutation operators are suggested for CSP in [31]: process defi-
nition, expression, and parameter modification operators. Each operator from the first
two classes is considered in this section, and we introduce some variations better suited465
to Circus models. When adequate, we refer to the rules of the Circus operational se-
mantics that formalise the affected behaviors.
Parameters are not as important inCircus as they are in CSP. SinceCircus processes
can have a state, parametrisation is typically used to define generic processes. In this
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Class Abbreviation Operator Source OPS Rules
B
eh
av
io
u
ra
l
O
p
er
at
o
rs
E
v
en
ts
ped Event Drop CSP 9, 30
per Event Replacement CSP 9, 30
pes Event Swap CSP 9, 30
pei Event Insert CSP 9, 30
O
p
er
at
o
rs
pco Choice Operator CSP 18 - 24
ppoParSeq Parallel Composition CSP* 14,15,25-30
ppoSeqPar Sequential Composition CSP* 25 - 30
ppoSeqInt Interleave CSP* 25 - 30
ppoParInt Interleave CSP* 25 - 30
ppoNameSet Parallel State Writing Circus 25 - 30
C
o
m
m
u
n
ic
. pmr Message Replacement CSP 10 - 12
pcr Channel Replacement CSP 10 - 12
pci Communication Insert CSP 10 - 12
pce Communication Elimination CSP 10 - 12
pcs Communication Swap CSP 10 - 12
N
am
e/
H
id
e pprAction Action Name Circus
pprSchema Schema Name Circus
pprHide Hide Events Circus 31 - 33
pprUnhide Unhide Events Circus 31 - 33
E
x
p
re
ss
io
n
O
p
er
at
o
rs
L
o
g
ic
al
eni Negation Insert CSP
eniGuard Guard Negation CSP* 17
elr Operator Replacement CSP
eld Operand Replacement CSP
A
ri
th
m
et
ic
al ear Operator Replacement CSP
eur Unary Insertion CSP
eak Add k to Operand CSP
esk Sub k from Operand CSP
ead Operand Replacement CSP
R
el
. err Operator Replacement CSP
Table 1: Mutation operators for Circus
case, parameters play the role of global constants in the scope of the process definition.470
We, therefore, do no consider parameter operators here.
Following the terminology in [31], synchronization events, that is, communications
without value passing, are called simply “events”. When values are passed, we refer to
the events as “communications”. Table 1 lists the operators presented in this section,
identifying their classification, abbreviation, name, source and, when available in Ap-475
pendix A, the associated operational semantics rules. The source column displays CSP
for operators originally proposed for CSP, CSP∗ for operators adapted from CSP to
match Circus constructs, and Circus for operators designed specifically for Circus.
We describe the operators as functions from texts (of actions) to texts, and identify
conditions in which they can or cannot be applied. A mutated process is obtained by480
applying one of these functions to one of its actions.
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process ChronoEDropTime =̂
...
Run =̂ (tick → IncSec; ((sec = 0) N IncMin)
@((sec , 0) N Skip)))
@(out !(min , sec)→ Skip)
• (AInit ; (µ X • (Run; X )))
...
Figure 11: Mutation of Chrono after dropping time
In the sequel, we present mutations of events and communications, choice and
concurrency operators, name references, and hiding.
4.1.1. Mutations of events
Event Drop. (ped ) removes one (arbitrary) occurrence of a prefixing event. Such muta-485
tion is likely to produce processes that are not a refinement of the original specification
in two ways: the removal of observable events from some traces and the possibility of
deadlock introduction in parallel compositions. This can be checked in the rules (A.2)
and (A.6) of the Circus operational semantics, reproduced in Appendix A, where out-
put and parallelism are described. The definition of the ped operator is as follows.490
ped (A[e→]) = A[ ]
Remark. We use A[t1] to indicate that in the text of action A there is an occurrence
of term t1. There may be several such occurrences and we assume that we can dis-
tinguish them (via their position in the text, for example). A[t1] refers to a particular
occurrence. A subsequent reference to A[t2] denotes the action obtained by replacing
the occurrence of t1 originally singled out by t2. In particular, A[ ] as used above de-495
notes the text of A with this occurrence replaced by an empty term. 
In using the above operator and others to follow, the terms singled out in the action
parameter, like e→ in A[e→] above, for example, need to be chosen.
Example 5. Figures 11 and 12 show the mutants of the Chrono process obtained via500
the mutations: ped (Chrono[time→]) and ped (Chrono[tick→]), which remove the
occurrences of the synchronization events time and tick from the Run action. Among
the traces of ChronoEDropTime that are not traces of Chrono, there are 〈out!(0, 0)〉
and 〈tick, out!(0, 1)〉, which lead to the tests below:
pass → out!(0, 0)→ fail → Stop
inc→ tick → pass → out!(0, 1)→ fail → Stop
They are members of FBTestsChrono
T
(ChronoEDropTime).505
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process ChronoEDropTick =̂
...
Run =̂ (IncSec; ((sec = 0) N IncMin)
@((sec , 0) N Skip)))
@(time → out !(min , sec)→ Skip)
• (AInit ; (µ X • (Run; X )))
...
Figure 12: Mutation of Chrono after dropping tick
ChronoEDropTick is an example of a divergent mutant, since Run may recurse
indefinitely in an endless series of internal actions IncSec and IncMin . without ever
communicating with the environment. Thus, it is discarded.

Event Replacement. (per ) replaces an event by another one within the current local510
scope (action) or the global scope (process). It affects traces in similar ways as the ped
operator, as described by the same rules of the operational semantics.
per (A[e→], f) = A[f→]
Event Swap. (pes) swaps two consecutive synchronization events in an action defi-
nition. If we apply it only to distinct events, this operator is prone to yielding mu-
tants of interest, although this cannot be assured. For example, swapping a and b in515
a→ b→ STOP @ b→ a→ STOP leads to a traces refinement. The behavior is defined
by the same rules (A.2) and (A.6) of the Circus operational semantics.
pes(A[e→ f→]) = A[f→ e→] where e , f
Event Insert. (pei ) inserts an event by duplication. The mutated action may not be of
interest if the duplication occurs inside a loop.
pei (A[e→]) = A[e→ e→]
This concludes our list of event mutation operators.520
4.1.2. Mutations of choice and concurrency operators
The following operators target choice and concurrency operators.
Choice Operator. (pco) replaces the external choice by the internal choice operator.
From rules (A.4) and (A.8) to (A.11) of the operational semantics, we observe that
such mutation may introduce deadlocks. The traces of the original and mutated actions525
are the same, so we always have a traces refinement. Therefore, the only error that may
be introduced by such a mutation is a forbidden deadlock.
pco(A[@]) = A[⊓]
We note that replacing an internal with an external choice is not of interest, sinceA⊓B
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is refined by A @ B , whether we consider traces or failures refinement.
Parallelism and sequence. (ppo) In [31], this operator can be used to replace an inter-530
leaving, a parallel or a sequential composition with each other. For Circus, we need to
consider manipulation of state values in concurrent actions. We, therefore, distinguish
the possible mutations for each type of composition.
Parallel composition of actions requires the explicit specification of which variables
are available for writing by each concurrent action. For instance, in the Circus parallel535
composition A J NSa | CS | NSb K B values written by A into the state variables are only
kept for the variables with names in the name set NSa . The same holds for the action
B and the name set NSb . These sets must be disjoint. Any change of value not match-
ing a name in the respective specified set is cancelled after the parallel composition
ends (see rules (A.5) to (A.7) of the operational semantics). There are several inter-540
esting possibilities for injecting faults in parallel composition operators. For instance,
to empty one or both name sets in a parallel composition is likely to yield unexpected
state configurations and is defined by the following operation.
ppoNameSet(A[NS]) = A[{}]
NS refers to a name set in a parallel composition. Removing or inserting arbitrary
elements in NS and other variations of this operator might also be of interest, provided545
the disjointness of the sets on both sides of the composition is preserved.
We define some specific operators for mutating the nature of the compositions.
Such mutations are likely to cause substantial observable changes, although there is no
guarantee that the result is a mutant of interest. Specific operators for changing parallel
to sequential and the inverse are defined as follows.
ppoParSeq(A[B J NSb | CS | NSc K C]) = A[B; C]
ppoSeqPar (A[; ], CS) = A[JCSK]
The new sequential composition introduced by ppoParSeq ignores the extra parame-
ters of the original parallel composition, that is, NSa, CS, and NSb, and the new parallel
composition introduced by ppoSeqPar is designed to synchronize on all channels in a
given set CS and has no write access to any state values. We also define operators for
mutating any composition into an interleaving.
ppoParInt(A[JCSK]) = A[9]
ppoSeqInt(A[; ]) = A[9]
Other forms of parallelism may be considered as well, but we do not pursue these here.
The needed considerations in all cases are similar to those above.
4.1.3. Mutations of communications
The following mutation operators target communications, whose behaviours are550
described in rules (A.2) and (A.3). For the sake of conciseness, we do not discuss
communications with multiple inputs or outputs.
The removal of an input communication can potentially introduce a syntax error,
because it implicitly declares a new variable. Except when the input variable is never
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used, we may end up with references to variables that are not declared. For mutation555
operators that change or remove input communications, we, therefore, introduce a dec-
laration of the replaced or removed variable. A Circus variable declaration introduces
the variable in scope initialised with an arbitrary value from the variable domain.
Message Replacement. (pmr ) changes the name of a variable used in a communication
to another name of a variable of the same type, selected from the current scope. As
explained above, missing variable names due to the introduced mutation are redeclared.
pmr (A[c!e[x]→], y) = A[c!e[y]→]
pmr (A[c?x→], y) = A[var x : T • c?y→]
T is the type of channel c (and, therefore, of the input variable x ).
Channel Replacement. (pcr ) changes the name of a communication channel to another
channel name of the same type.
pcr (A[c!e→], d) = A[d!e→]
pcr (A[c?x→], d) = A[d?x→]
Communication Insert. (pci ) is similar to the event insert (pei ) operator, but applied to
a communication instead of a synchronization event. It inserts a new communication
by duplicating an existing one.
pci (A[c!e→]) = A[c!e→ c!e→]
pci (A[c?x→]) = A[c?x→ c?x→]
Communication Elimination. (pce) removes one arbitrary input or output communi-560
cation from an action definition. As for the message replacement (pmr ) operator, if
the eliminated communication is an input, a variable declaration must be introduced to
declare the input variable and avoid syntactic errors.
pce(A[c?x→]) = A[var x : T •]
pce(A[c!e→]) = A[ ]
If the mutated action terminates or deadlocks, it has maximal traces. If the eliminated
communication contributes only to the last events of maximal traces, its elimination565
leads to an action that is a traces refinement of the original action.
Communication Swap. (pcs) swaps two consecutive communication events, similarly
to the event swap (pes) operator.
pcs(A[c1!e1→ c2!e2→]) = A[c2!e2→ c1!e1→]
pcs(A[c1!e→ c2?x→]) = A[c2?x→ c1!e→], provided x is not free in e
pcs(A[c1?x→ c2?y→]) = A[c2?y→ c1?x→]
pcs(A[c1?x→ c2!e→]) = A[var x : T • c2!e→ c1?x→]
When swapping c1 and c2 where c1 is used in an input that declares a variable that
may be used in an expression communicated by c2, this change leads to a syntactic570
error. To avoid that, a declaration of the input variable is introduced.
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4.1.4. Mutations of name references and hiding
Name Replacement. (ppr ) substitutes name references in the right hand side of an
action definition by other process names in scope, including STOP and SKIP . For
Circus, we expand this operator to include the manipulation of schema names.575
pprAction(A[A1], A2) = A[A2]
pprSchema(A[S1], S2) = A[S2]
We also introduce two new operators for hiding and unhiding events and communi-
cations. The impact of such mutations on observable behavior is similar to event and
communication insertion or removal. The channel set for the hiding is an arbitrary sub-
set of the channels in scope. The operational semantics rules describing the behavior
of the hiding operator are (A.12) and (A.13).
pprHide(A1[A2], CS) = A1[A2 \ CS]
pprUnhide(A1[A2 \ CS]) = A1[A2]
Similar operators for hiding are also useful at the action level.
4.2. Expression modification operators
In Circus specifications, some logical and data aspects are modelled along with
the definitions of interactions via events. For instance, models typically include guard
predicates, variable definitions and assignments, and also data operations defined using580
Z schemas. We consider all these forms of data modelling in the design of mutation
operators that capture data and logic faults.
Some fault classes for predicates occurring in software specifications have been
proposed by Kuhn in [32]. They seem pertinent if we consider plausible modelling
mistakes in Circus: variable reference, variable negation, expression negation, asso-585
ciative shifting, operator reference, and missing expressions. We also consider the ex-
pression operators introduced for CSP in [31], since they cover most of the mentioned
fault classes. Finally, to complement the fault-classes coverage, we also introduce some
syntactical operators for Circus expressions inspired by the work of Black et al. [33].
Negation Insertion. (eni ) inserts the logical negation operator (¬ ) before a boolean590
variable. This mutation is specially interesting when it affects guards, so we have a
more specific version of this operator targeting the negation of guards only.
eni (A[e]) = A[¬ e]
eniGuard (A[gN]) = A[¬ gN]
where e is a boolean expression in any Circus context, an action or a schema. For ex-
ample,MutatedChrono is obtained fromChrono via eniGuard (Chrono[(sec = 0)N]).
Logical Operator. (elr ) exchanges between the logical “and” (∧) and “or” (∨) opera-595
tors. Other logical connectors might be considered, although the most used and more
subject to modelling mistakes are these mentioned [31].
elr (A[∧]) = A[∨]
elr (A[∨]) = A[∧]
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Logical Operand. (eld ) introduces mutations by replacing variable and expression log-
ical operands with true or false constant values.
eld (A[b], true) = A[true]
eld (A[b], false) = A[false]
Arithmetic Operator. (ear ) replaces a basic arithmetic operator with one of the three600
others. The four operators considered are sum, subtraction, multiplication and division.
ear (A[op1], op2) = op1, where op2 ∈ {+,−, ∗, /} ∧ op1 , op2 • P[op2]
Unary Insertion. (eur) inserts the minus modifier in front of an arithmetic expression.
The variable e stands for an arithmetic expression in a process P .
eur (A[e]) = A[−e]
Add to Operand. (eak ) increments an arithmetic operand by an integer constant k . The
variable v stands for a numeric variable used in an expression in any schema or action.605
eak (A[v], k) = A[(v + k)]
Subtract from Operand. (esk ) is similar, but subtracts the integer constant k .
esk (A[v], k) = A[(v − k)]
Arithmetic Operand. (ead ) arbitrarily replaces a numeric variable used as an arith-
metic operand with another, keeping the types compatible. The variables v and u stand
for numeric variables of the same type.
ead (A[v], u) = A[u]
Relational Operator. (err ) replaces any of the relational operators <, ≤, >, ≥, =, ,610
with any of the others from this same set.
err (A[op1], op2) = op1, where op2 ∈ {<,≤, >,≥,=,,} ∧ op1 , op2 • A[op2]
A mutation operator is ideal for a specification if it generates only mutants of interest;
an ideal operator never leads to a refinement. Ideality is a strong requirement, not
always achievable. None of the operators above is ideal. In fact, there can be no ideal
operator for Circus: a single change to a process definition can never be guaranteed to615
lead to a non-refinement for every process. This can be seen by considering a process
Q , an arbitrary mutation operator Op, and a process P defined as P = Q ⊓Op(Q). In
applying Op to P , it is always possible to obtain P ′ = Op(Q) ⊓Op(Q). Properties of
Circus guarantee that P ′ = Op(Q), which does refine P .
4.3. Comparison with mutation testing based on LOTOS620
Several specification languages make it possible to mix data type and behaviour
descriptions. The approach followed above for the definition of a set of mutation op-
erators can be easily transposed to them. We take as an example the full LOTOS
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specification language, whose mutations have been studied in [47], and whose testing
theory is developed in [25]. In a few words, LOTOS combines algebraic data type625
specifications and parameterised process definitions.
The LOTOS notation for process definition is syntactically close to those of Circus
and CSP; however, there are semantic differences that arise, as far as testing is con-
cerned, in the definition of refusals and acceptance sets. Given the definition of these
sets, symbolic exhaustive test sets have been defined for conf [24] and for the ioco [11]630
conformance relation [25]. The main difference to Circus is the notion of state, which
does not exist in LOTOS, and is simulated by process parameters like in CSP.
In [47], the authors propose a set of mutation operators. Most of them are not
special to LOTOS and, as ours, have been taken or slightly adapted from [33] and [31].
They correspond to those indicated with source CSP or CSP∗ in Table 1, and seem to635
provide a kernel of mutation operators for specification languages of this category. The
few specific operators defined in [47] and here are related to parameters in LOTOS,
and to action and schema names in the case of Circus.
5. Tool support
To support Circus mutation testing and explore the practical aspects of our tech-640
nique, we have implemented a prototype tool in Java to mutate specifications using
the mutation operators of Section 4. Syntax-tree manipulation is provided by the CZT
framework [48], using the Circus parser extension [49].
At the current stage, the prototype provides a simple command line interface that
takes as inputs a mutation operator reference and a LATEX Circus specification, ac-645
cording to the CZT style guide for Circus1. The output is presented as LATEX Circus
specifications, one for each mutation produced by the selected operator. In Table 2, we
show the number of mutants produced by each operator when applied to Chrono (in
Figure 1). Operators not applicable to this example have not been considered.
Once the mutants are generated, we have to generate tests to kill them. We present650
below two approaches for the generation of mutant-killing test cases.
The first approach requires the use of a model checker. Similar approaches for
generating test cases using model checkers are popular; see, for instance, [50] for a
survey. In our case, the checker is used to establish whether a generated mutant is a
refinement of the original specification and, if not, to yield some counterexamples that655
provide a basis for building killer tests as illustrated in Section 3.
For Circus, there is no mature refinement model checker available at this time. It
is not the objective of our work to develop one (and there are ongoing efforts [51, 52]
in this direction). However, for some Circus specifications, we can overcome this
barrier via a translation of Circus models to CSP and the use of a well-known, mature660
refinement checker for CSP, FDR [53]. We detail this approach in Section 5.1.
The second approach for the generation of mutant-killing test cases is a (guided)
generation of traces directly from the Circus specification. The traces are then con-
1Available at: http://czt.sourceforge.net/latex/circus/circus-guide.pdf, accessed:
Dec/13/2015.
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Abbreviation Operator Mutants Killed by FDR
ped Event Drop 1 1
per Event Replacement 2 2
pei Event Insert 2 2
pco Choice Operator 2 2
ppoSeqPar Sequential Composition 1 1
ppoSeqInt Interleave 1 1
pmr Message Replacement 2 2
pci Communication Insert 1 1
pce Communication Elimination 1 1
pprSchema Schema Name 6 6
eniGuard Guard Negation 2 2
eld Operand Replacement 4 4
ear Operator Replacement 1 1
eur Unary Insertion 2 2
eak Add k to Operand 6 6
esk Sub k from Operand 6 6
ead Operand Replacement 6 6
err Operator Replacement 10 8
Table 2: Analysis of generated mutants for Chrono
verted into test cases. Various techniques can be used to guide the trace generation in
order to obtain relevant traces. We describe this approach in Section 5.2.665
5.1. Test generation via CSP and FDR
This approach is applicable only to Circus specifications with simple data models
that can be directly encoded in CSP without further refinement. It has been, in any
case, very useful to validate our ideas and approach. We discuss below the translation
from Circus to CSP and the test-generation technique.670
5.1.1. Translating Circus specifications into CSP
As shown in [54], a subset of Circus can be automatically translated to CSP; the
main challenge is complex Z specifications. To carry out the experiments reported here
and validate our approach to testing, however, we have carried out translation by hand.
To work with FDR, the specifications must be translated into the machine readable675
dialect of CSP [55] following the guidelines below:
• Channels and types are kept;
• The state components are encapsuled into a single data type with constructor
AState , and passed as parameter to all processes and functions;
• A Circus action is translated into a CSP process;680
• A reference to a schema s in an action A is unfolded to an intermediary process
A s(s(AState));
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• Loops are translated as tail recursive calls;
• State changes defined by Z operations are performed by CSP functions from
AState to AState .685
Example 6. For instance, Figure 13 shows the translation of Chrono. The AInit ,
IncSec and IncMin Circus schemas are translated to the ainit, incsec and incmin
functions. Arguments and results of these functions are yielded by the type constructor
AState, encapsulating values for the two state components sec and min . The anony-
mous main action of Chrono is translated into the CHRONO CSP process. The initiali-690
sation is captured by the parameter of the call to process RUN. The loop is captured by
parameterised recursive calls at the end of each choice of RUN. The references to the
schemas IncSec and IncMin inside the Run action are unfolded into the sub-process
RUN incsec and RUN incsec incmin.
695
5.1.2. Using FDR for fault-based test-case generation
In Section 3 we have explained that counterexamples yielded by a refinement check
of a mutant against the original specification provide bases to build tests to kill the
mutant. Figure 14 shows the output of FDR for the checkCHRONO ⊑F MCHRONO
for failures refinement in the context of the definitions in Figure 13. It defines the700
following trace s , forbidden continuation a , and acceptance set X .
s = 〈tick , time〉 a = out .1.1 X = {out .0.1}
For this experiment, the production of a counterexample gives rise to our account of
the mutant as killed in Table 2. As stated in Theorem 1, finding such counterexamples
is enough to assure that MCHRONO is a mutant of interest: it gives us the necessary
elements to build a test case for, at least, the failures fault-based set.705
In the particular example of the CHRONO ⊑F MCHRONO analysis, we have
both a failure and a forbidden continuation, allowing the construction of one test for
each of the FBTestsCHRONO
T
(MCHRONO) and FBTestsCHRONO
F
(MCHRONO)
sets. Such tests are constructed using the TT and TF functions.
TT (s , a) = inc → tick → inc → time → pass → out .1.1 → fail → Stop
TF (s ,X ) = inc → tick → fail → time → fail → out .0.1 → pass → Stop
In the traces of the execution of a parallel composition between the mutantMCHRONO710
and any of these tests the last verdict event is fail , thus the tests kill the mutant.
All mutants generated for Chrono (in Figure 1) have been translated to CSP and
analysed with FDR. As shown in Table 2, only two of the mutants are not of interest.
Both are generated by the relational operator replacement err , and are in Figure 15.
The changes introduced by err in both ChronoErrEquiv1 and ChronoErrEquiv2715
occur in the expressions guarding the external choice between IncMin and Skip. In
ChronoErrEquiv1, the original guard (sec = 0) is replaced with (sec ≤ 0), and for
ChronoErrEquiv2, the guard (sec , 0) is replaced with (sec > 0). Both changes
cause no observable effect, since Range imposed lower boundary to sec is 0.
26
---- The chronometer in CSP_M
--Type and channels declaration
Range = {0..59}
channel tick, time
channel out:Range.Range
--State simulation with single data type
Minsec = {(min,sec) | min <- Range, sec <- Range}
datatype Clock = AState.Minsec
--AInit schema translation: state initialization min=0 and sec=0
ainit() = AState.(0,0)
--IncSec schema translation: increments sec by one within Range
incsec(AState.(min,sec)) = AState.(min,(sec+1)%60)
--IncMin schema translation: increments min by one within Range
incmin(AState.(min,sec)) = AState.((min+1)%60,sec)
--Anonymous action to RUN process, with ainit state inialization
CHRONO = RUN(ainit())
--Run action translation, stateful loop achieved using recursion
RUN(AState.(min,sec)) =
tick -> RUN_incsec(incsec(AState.(min,sec)))
[]
time -> out.min.sec -> RUN(AState.(min,sec))
--Run sub-process translation, applying incsec function
RUN_incsec(AState.(min,sec)) =
(sec == 0) & RUN_incsec_incmin(incmin(AState.(min,sec)))
[]
(sec != 0) & RUN(AState.(min,sec))
RUN_incsec_incmin(AState.(min,sec)) = RUN(AState.(min,sec));
--First mutant generated with eniGuard operator
MCHRONO = MRUN(ainit())
MRUN(AState.(min,sec)) =
tick -> MRUN_incsec(incsec(AState.(min,sec)))
[]
time -> out.min.sec -> MRUN(AState.(min,sec))
MRUN_incsec(AState.(min,sec)) =
--Negated guard mutation introduced below
(not sec == 0) & MRUN_incsec_incmin(incmin(AState.(min,sec)))
[]
(sec != 0) & MRUN(AState.(min,sec))
MRUN_incsec_incmin(AState.(min,sec)) = MRUN(AState.(min,sec));
Figure 13: Chrono in CSP
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Result: Failed
Visited States: 7
Visited Transitions: 17
Visited Plys: 2
Estimated Total Storage: 67MB
Counterexample (Trace Counterexample)
Specification Debug:
Trace: <tick, time>
Available Events: {out.0.1}
Implementation Debug:
MRUN(AState.(0, 0)) (Trace Behaviour):
Trace: <tick, time>
Error Event: out.1.1
Figure 14: FDR output for CHRONO ⊑F MCHRONO
5.2. Test Generation from Circus specifications720
The generation of tests from Circus specifications has been investigated and auto-
mated in the CirTA tool [56, 57], which uses an exhaustive approach to collect cstraces,
along with their symbolic forbidden continuations and minimal acceptance sets, and
enriches them with inc, pass and fail verdict events. Since in that work there is no
selection based on the text of the specification, there is no need for specification traces.725
As explained in Section 3, for generating mutant-killing test cases, a first selection
step of relevant specification traces is needed. The mutant (or, more precisely, the part
where it differs from the specification) serves as a guide for the collection of these
traces. In this section, we elaborate on this idea, proposing a chain of tools for test
generation following the approach sketched at the end of Section 3.730
Figure 16 depicts our proposed tool chain. In the first step, the specification, the
mutation point, and the mutant are provided as input to a specification-trace genera-
tor (SpTG), which derives specification traces using a guided symbolic execution of the
mutant. The aim is to generate relevant specification traces, as defined in Section 3.4.
For that, techniques of slicing can be used, similar to what is done for program analysis735
[58] and communicating automata specifications [59]. A generator based on the transi-
tion system that characterises specification traces is under development. The slicer and
the check with respect to the original specification are the next steps.
We note that, instead of producing linear traces, the symbolic execution can easily
be adapted for producing some symbolic execution tree. Such a tree can be the basis740
of tree-shaped tests, which avoid inconclusive verdicts by relaxing the constraint in-
troduced by linear tests, that the SUT must follow one expected trace: the SUT can
choose among the correct traces embedded in the tree. Such a factorization of linear
tests, as discussed in [41], has the advantage of decreasing both the number of tests and
the number of inconclusive verdicts, but the drawback that it leaves some control to the745
SUT with the risk that some relevant traces are not attempted.
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process ChronoErrEquiv1 =̂
...
Run =̂ (tick → IncSec; ((sec ≤ 0) N IncMin)
@((sec , 0) N Skip)))
@(time → out !(min , sec)→ Skip)
• (AInit ; (µ X • (Run; X )))
process ChronoErrEquiv2 =̂
...
Run =̂ (tick → IncSec; ((sec = 0) N IncMin)
@((sec > 0) N Skip)))
@(time → out !(min , sec)→ Skip)
• (AInit ; (µ X • (Run; X )))
Figure 15: Two equivalent mutants of Chrono exposed by FDR
Figure 16: Test Generation from Circus specifications.
In a second step, the set of specification traces are given as input to a cstrace gen-
erator (CsTG). Each specification trace is converted into one cstrace. A constructive
conversion procedure is formally specified in [28]. As explained in Section 3, it is
based on an operational semantics that characterises the behavior of the path of a Cir-750
cus specification identified by the labels of a specification trace. As can be expected,
since the events, guards, and actions identified in specification traces are components of
Circus actions, the operational semantics used in the conversion is very similar to a re-
stricted subset of the Circus semantics. The automation of the conversion is, therefore,
similar to the component of SpTG that calculates specification traces.755
A prototype tool for proving (or disproving) refinements of Circus specifications,
Isabelle/Circus, is presented in [60]2. For each translated cstrace, CsTG checks whether
it is a new cstrace or if it introduces any new deadlock, using Isabelle/Circus and
reusing some components of the CirTA tool; if not, the cstrace is also discarded. CsTG
2Available at: http://afp.sf.net/entries/Circus.shtml, accessed: Dec/13/2015.
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yields a set of cstraces with their symbolic forbidden continuations and acceptance760
sets. Each cstrace is converted (by SyTG) into a symbolic test by adding the verdicts at
the appropriate points. These symbolic tests are adequately instantiated using an SMT
solver as reported and illustrated in [57]. An example is given in Section 6.
The tool chain is expected to work using a lazy scheme, that is, a computation is
only performed when its result is required. Thus, we avoid generating infinite sets of765
specification traces and cstraces, with, when necessary, some limitation on the length
of the considered specification traces or cstraces.
The classical undecidable problem of equivalent mutants of programs [61] arises
here under the form of checking whether a Circus model is a refinement of another one.
For such a rich specification language, the use of a powerful proof assistant is unavoid-770
able. The prototype Isabelle/Circus environment [60] is based upon the Isabelle/HOL
proof environment where theories and rules of Circus semantics and refinement have
been embedded. Once enriched with efficient dedicated proof tactics, it can be used
both for a preliminary refinement check for test generation and for rejection of those
cstraces that are cstraces of the original specification.775
Our efforts are now focused in prototyping the necessary parts of the tool chain
for automating the described strategy. The most complex and challenging tool is the
SpTG, whose implementation starts to yield some preliminary results for a small subset
of the Circus operational semantics. Considering the established theory background,
it is a matter of time to achieve an operational level, allowing us to shift our concerns780
into issues of optimization and scalability.
6. Cash Machine: Another example
In this section, we illustrate how the approach we propose can be used for guiding
test generation, using a more complex Circus specification as an example. We con-
sider several mutant operators and the respective mutants, and discuss some interesting785
characteristics of the process of analysing them and generating the killer tests.
Figure 17 presents a slightly modified version of the cash-machine example used
in [28]. First of all, we declare the set CARD of valid cards. Next, we declare some
channels. Requests for money are accepted by the cash machine through the channel
inc, which takes a card and the amount to be withdrawn. The amount is a positive790
natural number. Cards are returned through a channel outc. The notes in and dispensed
by the cash machine are those whose denominations are in the setNote . For simplicity,
we consider just a few notes, and do not address the fact that the amount requested
must be decomposable in terms of the notes available. If it is not, the machine fails
to dispense the cash. In our model, cash is represented as a bag of notes: elements795
of the set Cash . If there is enough money in the machine and a way of providing the
requested amount, the cash is output through a channel cash . The channel refill is used
to request the note bank of the cash machine to be refilled.
The cash machine accepts requests for cash and decides whether the cash should
be dispensed. The only state component of CashMachine is a function nBank that800
records, for each denomination, the amount of notes available. The state is defined by
a schema, CMState , which declares nBank as a total function.
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[CARD]
channel inc : CARD × N1; outc : CARD ; cash : Cash; refill
Note == {10, 20, 50}
Cash == bagNote
process CashMachine =̂ begin
state CMState == [nBank : Note → 0 . . cap ]
DispenseNotes
∆CMState
a? : N1
notes! : Cash
Σnotes! = a?
∀n : Note • (notes! ♯ n) ≤ nBank n ∧ nBank ′ n = (nBank n) − (notes! ♯ n)
DispenseError
ΞCMState
a? : N1; notes! : Cash
¬ ∃ns : Cash • Σns = a? ∧ ∀n : Note • (ns ♯ n) ≤ nBank n
notes! =|[ ]|
Dispense == DispenseNotes ∨ DispenseError
•

µ X •

inc?c?a→
outc!c→X
⊓
var notes : Cash •
Dispense;
(notes ,|[ ]|)N cash!notes → Skip
@
(notes =|[ ]|)N Skip



; outc!c→X

@
refill → nBank := { 10 7→ cap, 20 7→ cap, 50 7→ cap } ; X


end
Figure 17: Cash machine specification
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Abbreviation Operator Mutants
ped Event Drop 1
pei Event Insert 1
pco Choice Operator 2
ppoSeqPar Sequential Composition 3
ppoSeqInt Interleave 3
pci Communication Insert 4
pce Communication Elimination 4
pprSchema Schema Name 2
eni Negation Insert 6
eniGuard Guard Negation 2
elr Operator Replacement 3
eld Operand Replacement 16
ear Operator Replacement 3
eur Unary Insertion 1
eak Add k to Operand 8
esk Sub k from Operand 8
ead Operand Replacement 6
err Operator Replacement 20
Table 3: Count of mutants generated for CashMachine
TheDispenseNotes data operation takes an amount a? as input and produces a bag
of notes notes! as output; it also updates nBank . It is defined using a Z schema that
specifies a relation on CMState . The value of notes! is nondeterministically chosen: it805
is any bag notes! whose sum Σnotes! of its elements is equal to a?, and such that, for
each note denomination n , the number notes! ♯ n of occurrences of n is less than or
equal to the number nBank n of notes of denomination n in the bank.
If there is no such bag, we have an error: the output is the empty bag |[ ]|, and the
state is not changed. This is defined by the schemaDispenseError . The total operation810
to Dispense cash is the schema disjunction of DispenseNotes and DispenseError .
The main action of CashMachine defines that it accepts a request inc?c?a; this
is an input of any card c and any amount a . It then decides whether to output the
card using outc and no money, or dispense the requested amount using cash . The
decision is nondeterministic; it is defined by factors outside of this model: status of the815
card, balance on the corresponding account, and so on. The cash machine also accepts
requests to refill the note bank. A recursion offers these choices over and over again.
We have used our mutant-generation prototype for the CashMachine example.
The resulting numbers are shown in Table 3. We consider some mutations below.
6.1. Communication elimination (pce) of the first occurrence of outc!c820
We consider first the mutant obtained by applying the pce operator to remove
the first occurrence of outc!c. We call MutatedCashMachine ′ the resulting process.
Among its specification traces that reach the mutation point, there are 〈inc?c?a , refill〉
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and 〈inc?c?a , inc?c?a〉. The corresponding cstraces are shown below.
(〈inc?α0?α1, refill〉, α0 ∈ CARD ∧ α1 ∈ N1)
(〈inc?α0?α1, inc?α2?α3〉, α0 ∈ CARD ∧ α1 ∈ N1 ∧ α2 ∈ CARD ∧ α3 ∈ N1)
They are not cstraces of CashMachine , and so these traces ofMutatedCashMachine ′825
are relevant for testing against traces refinement. The test generation can be done via
the selection of one of the specification traces above, its translation into its cstrace, and
the construction of the corresponding symbolic test. For the second one we have:
inc → inc?α0?α1 : (α0 ∈ CARD ∧ α1 ∈ N1) → pass →
inc?α2?α3 : (α2 ∈ CARD ∧ α3 ∈ N1) → fail → Stop
By resolution of the constraints on α0, α1, α2, α3, choosing cards α0 and α2, and amounts
α1 and α3, we can obtain a concrete test that killsMutatedCashMachine
′.830
6.2. Communication elimination (pce) of the second occurrence of outc!c
When removing the second occurrence of the outc!c event, the following specifi-
cation traces appear, that reach the mutation point:
〈inc?c?a, var notes, Dispense, notes , |[ ]|, cash!notes,Skip, inc?c?a〉
〈inc?c?a, var notes, Dispense, notes , |[ ]|, cash!notes,Skip, refill〉
〈inc?c?a, var notes, Dispense, notes = |[ ]|,Skip, inc?c?a〉
〈inc?c?a, var notes, Dispense, notes = |[ ]|,Skip, refill〉
The corresponding cstraces are shown below.
( 〈inc?α0?α1, cash!α2, inc?α3?α4〉,
α0 ∈ CARD ∧ α1 ∈ N1 ∧ α2 ∈ Cash ∧ Σα2 = α1 ∧ α3 ∈ CARD ∧ α4 ∈ N1 )
( 〈inc?α0?α1, cash!α2, refill〉,
α0 ∈ CARD ∧ α1 ∈ N1 ∧ α2 ∈ Cash ∧ Σα2 = α1 )
( 〈inc?α0?α1, inc?α2?α3〉, α0 ∈ CARD ∧ α1 ∈ N1 ∧ α2 ∈ CARD ∧ α3 ∈ N1 )
( 〈inc?α0?α1, refill〉, α0 ∈ CARD ∧ α1 ∈ N1 )
They are not cstraces of the original specification and can be used as bases for killer835
tests. The last two cstraces are the same as those obtained when dealing with the
removal of the first occurrence of outc!c in the previous section.
6.3. Substitution (pprSchema) of the reference to Dispense by DispenseError
As another example, we consider the mutant obtained by the application of the
pprSchema operator to the second occurrence of the Dispense schema name (that is,840
the use of Dispense in the variable block that declares notes in the main action of the
process CashMachine in Figure 17). We can use pprSchema to replace Dispense
with, for instance, DispenseError , whose precondition may not hold.
The specification trace below reaches the mutation point.
〈inc?c?a , var notes , DispenseError〉
It is a specification trace of the mutated specification because, in some cases, the pre-845
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•
µ X •

inc?c?a→
outc!c→X
⊓
var notes : Cash •
Dispense;
(notes ,|[ ]|)N cash!notes → Skip
@
(notes =|[ ]|)N Skip



; outc!c→X

@
refill → refill → nBank := { 10 7→ cap, 20 7→ cap, 50 7→ cap } ; X


end
Figure 18: Mutated main action of CashMachine with event refill inserted/duplicated
condition of DispenseError is satisfied: it depends on the initialisation of nBank .
The corresponding cstrace is:
(〈inc?α0?α1〉, α0 ∈ CARD ∧ α1 ∈ N1)
It is a cstrace of the original specification, but after inc?c?a , the internal choice leads
either to (outc!c) or to DispenseError . If the precondition of DispenseError does
not hold, it behaviour is divergent. Therefore, this mutant is discarded.850
6.4. Insertion of event (pei ) refill
The result of a mutation using pei to duplicate the event refill in the main action of
CashMachine is given in Figure 18. It has new specification traces, like, for instance:
〈refill, refill, nBank := { 10 7→ cap, 20 7→ cap, 50 7→ cap }〉
The corresponding cstrace is (〈refill, refill〉,True), which is a cstrace of the origi-
nal CashMachine process. We observe the same situation for all the new specification
traces: they are new because they embed the subtrace
〈. . . refill , refill ,nBank := { 10 7→ cap, 20 7→ cap, 50 7→ cap }, . . .〉
or finish with a double occurrent of refill . In the corresponding cstraces, these give
rise to subtraces (〈. . . refill, refill, . . .〉, . . .), which are admitted byCashMachine .855
This means that the original and the mutated processes have the same traces, and we
cannot distinguish them with a test for traces inclusion.
This mutant, however, has new failures. For example,
〈refill, nBank := { 10 7→ cap, 20 7→ cap, 50 7→ cap }, inc?c?a〉,
is a specification trace ofCashMachine , but not of the mutated process. After the trace
〈refill〉, the only accepted event of the mutated process is refill and any instantiation860
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of inc?c?a is refused. So, 〈refill〉 paired with a singleton set containing an event
inc.c.a is a failure of the mutated process, but not of CashMachine . On the other
hand, the singleton set is a minimal acceptance of CashMachine after 〈refill〉, and any
instantiation of the symbolic test below is a killer test.
inc → refill → fail → inc?α0?α1 : (α0 ∈ CARD ∧ α1 ∈ N1) → pass → Stop
Instantiation requires the choice of values for α0 and α1 that satisfy the given constraint.865
6.5. Mutation of choice operator (pco)
Amutation of the external choice in the main action ofCashMachine into an inter-
nal choice, using pco, gives rise to a situation similar to that of the previous section. As
noted in Section 4, such a mutation does not introduce new specification traces. It can,
however, introduce failures. For instance, refill may be refused after the empty trace870
by the mutated process, but not by CashMachine , which has a minimal acceptance
{refill } after the empty trace. A killer test is fail → refill → pass → Stop.
6.6. Communication insert (pci)
The communication insert operator pci is similar to the event insert pei operator
considered in the previous section. It is, however, applied to a communication instead875
of a synchronization. We consider here the duplication of cash!notes . A specification
trace that reaches the mutation point is as follows.
〈inc?c?a, var notes, Dispense, notes , |[ ]|, cash!notes, cash!notes〉
The corresponding cstrace is
( 〈inc?α0?α1, cash!α2, cash!α3〉,
α0 ∈ CARD ∧ α1 ∈ N1 ∧ α2 ∈ Cash ∧ Σα2 = α1 ∧ α3 ∈ Cash ∧ α3 = α2 )
It is not a cstrace of CashMachine and leads to the symbolic test below.
inc → inc?α0?α1 : (α0 ∈ CARD ∧ α1 ∈ N1) → inc →
cash!α2 : (α2 ∈ Cash ∧ Σα2 = α1) → pass →
cash!α3 : (α3 ∈ Cash ∧ α3 = α2) → fail → Stop
Once the above test is instantiated, it yields a killer test.880
6.7. Mutation of sequential compositions (ppoSeqPar )
The new parallel compositions introduced by ppoSeqPar synchronise on all chan-
nels in a given set CS and have no write access to any variables. In the main action
of CashMachine , there are three sequential compositions. We show in Figure 19 the
result of mutating the one insider the variable block that declares notes .885
In this case, the mutated process may deadlock after Dispense . Both parallel ac-
tions act on the arbitrary initial value of notes . If that value is not the empty bag, since
the synchronisation on cash required by the external choice cannot happen, because
Dispense is not ready to communicate on cash , there is a deadlock. If, however, that
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
µ X •

inc?c?a→
outc!c→X
⊓
var notes : Cash •
Dispense
J{| inc, outc, cash , refill |}K
(notes ,|[ ]|)N cash!notes → Skip
@
(notes =|[ ]|)N Skip



; outc!c→X

@
refill → nBank := { 10 7→ cap, 20 7→ cap, 50 7→ cap } ; X


Figure 19: Mutation of the first occurrence of ; by ppoSeqPar
arbitrary initial value happens to be the empty bag, the mutated process does not dead-890
lock. It dispenses the card via outc without changing the state, since the changes made
by the parallel actions cannot be recorded in any variables. So, we have a fail safe.
The cstrace (〈inc?α0?α1〉, α0 ∈ CARD ∧ α1 ∈ N1) is associated with a set of
symbolic acceptances including (outc!α3, α0 ∈ CARD ∧ α1 ∈ N1 ∧ α3 = α0) and
(cash!α3, α0 ∈ CARD ∧ α1 ∈ N1 ∧ α3 ∈ Cash ∧ Σα3 = α1). This is not an acceptance895
of the mutated process, and can be used to define a killer test.
inc → inc?α0?α1 : (α0 ∈ CARD ∧ α1 ∈ N1) → fail →
outc!α3 : (α0 ∈ CARD ∧ α1 ∈ N1 ∧ α3 = α0) → pass → Stop
@
cash!α3 : (α0 ∈ CARD ∧ α1 ∈ N1 ∧ α3 ∈ Cash ∧ Σα3 = α1) → pass → Stop

Instantiation keeps the restrictions on the inputs and defines specific values for outputs.
Above, the value of α3 has different constraints in the outputs via outc and cash .
Based on the examples in this section, we note that the construction of test cases
from mutants is a very challenging task, which demands the support of specialised900
tools. The tool support we discuss in Section 5 is paramount for making our approach
practical and we are placing efforts in developing it with the aid of frameworks for sym-
bolic manipulation and constraint solvers. In Appendix B, we include further examples
of mutants for a Circus specification (of an Emergency Recovery System).
7. Related Work905
Mutation has already been used for guiding test-case generation from (formal)
models in many different pieces of work [62, 63, 64, 31, 36, 65, 66, 67, 68]. As al-
ready mentioned, it is also used to assess the quality of a test suite. The possibility of
selecting on which errors to concentrate is a good mechanism to tackle the explosion
of test cases (see [50] and [66] for recent surveys). A more general survey on the main910
developments of mutation testing is found in [69].
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Budd and Gopal [70] have pioneered the investigation on testing by mutating spec-
ifications. They propose the use of a mutant of a specification to generate tests for
programs. Specifications are based on predicate calculus. The mutant is a variation of
a predicate defining the expected behavior of the program. A test case is an input for915
which the original specification and the mutant produce different truth values.
Ammann et al. [71] use the SMVmodel checker to generate test cases frommutants
of a specification. The mutant operators are defined at the syntactical level, and the
test cases are traces of the specification but not of the mutant. The application of a
similar approach to an industrial case study is reported in [72]. Simulink models are920
mutated and the test cases are generated with CBMC (bounded model checker for C).
Generation of tests from mutated Simulink models is also investigated in [73].
The work of Papadakis et al. [74, 75, 76] automates white-box test-case generation
for programs, relying on symbolic and concolic execution, mutant schemata and the
weak mutation-testing criterion. The goals are to lower the cost of test-case generation925
and increase the quality of the obtained test suite.
Mutation testing has also been used to generate test cases for security-critical sys-
tems in [63]. The mutants are used to model vulnerabilities. A constraint solver is
employed to find a trace of the mutant that does not satisfy the security properties of
the system. If such a trace exists, the mutant introduces a vulnerability and the test case930
shows how to exploit it. This approach is similar to ours, but due to the nature of the
model we use, refinement verification is employed instead of a constraint solver. Sim-
ilarly, the work by John Clark et al. [31], whose mutant operators we have considered
in Section 4, uses mutation testing for checking system security. Moreover, Clark et
al. use the mutants to validate the specification, while we use them to generate tests.935
Krenn and Aichernig [64] mutate program contracts and use the SAT solvers Boo-
gie and Z3 to generate test cases for Spec# models. Their proposed technique auto-
matically generate tests that can distinguish whether an implementation refines a faulty
specification. We use mutants to select tests from our fault-based exhaustive test sets.
Aichernig and colleagues have advanced the application of mutation testing for940
models in various formalisms [36, 65, 62, 66]. A test case is seen as an abstraction
(according to a traces-refinement relation) of the specification, that is, an implemen-
tation (or specification) should refine the test case if it passes the test. Thus, test-case
synthesis is a reverse refinement problem. Mutants guide the generation of test cases; a
fault detecting test case is an abstraction of the specification, but not of the mutant. The945
theory is developed in the context of Hoare and He’s UTP [19]. Mutants are generated
both for the specification and the implementation. Our approach is on the same vein of
Aichernig and colleagues’ work, extending the main concepts to a new formalism.
8. Conclusions and future work
We have formally defined mutation testing for Circus by characterising (1) the950
exhaustive sets of tests that can kill a given mutant, considering both traces refinement
and conf , that is, process refinement in Circus as a whole; (2) a technique to select
tests from these sets based on specification traces of the mutants; and (3) an extensive
collection of operators to generate mutants considering faults related to both reactive
37
and data manipulation behaviour. Like the Circus testing theory, this work is of general955
relevance for state-rich algebras for refinement.
To make our ideas concrete, we have led some preliminary experimentation on
models that are both simple enough (regarding its data structures) and finite to enable
model checking via FDR. We have also developed a first tool in Java for mutant gen-
eration, which is the front-end both for using FDR and for a chain of tools we have960
defined for mutants analysis and killer-tests generation. The mutant analysis can make
use of the IsabelleCircus refinement checker, and the test generation can use some
components of the exhaustive test generator CirTA.
We, however, are not in a position to provide experimental results that address
scalability, since the tool chain we have available so far is not suitable for conducting965
such studies. The main bottleneck we foresee is the cost of the symbolic manipulation
of the model, which we expect to tackle using slicing techniques. Another issue is
related to decidability problems regarding the identification of useless mutants, namely,
those that refine the original model. We have not addressed this yet, but will in the
future steps of our research using model checking and automated theorem proving.970
Given a mutation operator such as one of those given in Section 4, it is attractive
to avoid constructing the mutants to generate the tests to kill them as described above.
For that, we need a way of calculating the traces and failures of the mutants without
constructing them. This calculation could take advantage of the knowledge of traces
and failures of the original process, but the effect of the mutation operators on the975
semantics of a process is not direct. More precisely, the semantic models of interest are
not a congruence for the mutant operators. This gives rise to an interesting challenge.
Generally, mutations are syntactic changes. Since our specification traces are close
to the syntax of the specifications, it may well be the case that they do provide an
adequate way to construct traces of the mutants in terms of those of the original speci-980
fication. An analysis of mutation operators for specification traces and their relation to
our operators is an interesting avenue for future work.
We also plan to investigate “semantic mutations”. The idea is to consider the sets
of traces and failures of the specification and to study mutations of these sets. This
will avoid the construction of the syntactic mutants. It is important to note that the985
mutations must preserve the properties of the sets, for instance, the set of traces is
prefix-closed, and the set of failures is subset-closed with respect to refusal sets.
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Appendix A. Circus operational semantics
We reproduce here part of the Circus operational semantics as presented in [45].
As already said, as usual, the operational semantics of Circus is based on a transi-
tion relation that associates configurations. For processes, the configurations are pro-995
cesses themselves. For actions, they are triples as explained in Section 2.1.
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To give the operational semantics of a process, we use a novel construct to define a
process. It records the current local state using a constraint and a state assignment. The
first transition rule for processes below introduces the record of the local state using
a (list of) fresh symbolic variable(s) w0. The constraint defines that w0 is (are) of the1000
appropriate type(s), and in the state assignment w0 is assigned to the state component(s)
x. In all rules, the symbolic variables introduced are assumed to be fresh.

begin
state [ x : T ]
• A
end

ǫ
−→

begin
state [ x : T ] | loc (w0 ∈ T | x := w0)
• A
end

(A.1)
The second transition rule for processes, which we omit here for conciseness, applies
to the extended form of a basic process. The rule allows a process to evolve in accor-1005
dance with the evolution of its main action in the state defined by the loc clause. We,
therefore, focus in the sequel on the transition relation for actions.
The evolution of an output prefixing d!e→ A is labelled. The label d.w0 involves
the fresh constant w0; the new constraint defines its value to be that of e in the current
state s. The remaining action to be executed is A.1010
c
(c | s |= d!e→ A)
d!w0
−→ (c ∧ (s; w0 = e) | s |= A)
(A.2)
The transition rule for an input prefixing d?x→ A is as follows.
c ∧ T , ∅ x < αs
(c | s |= d?x : T→ A)
d?w0
−→ (c ∧ w0 ∈ T | s; var x := w0 |= let x • A)
(A.3)
The label is d?w0. In the new the state, x is declared and assigned w0. The only restric-
tion on w0 is that it has the same type as d. The remaining action let x • A records1015
the fact that x is in scope in A as a local variable. The construct let x • A has been
introduced specifically for use in the operational semantics. When A terminates, a rule
for let x • Skip closes the scope of x in the state and removes the let x declaration.
For an internal choice A1 ⊓ A2, silent transitions are available to either A1 or A2 (in
a configuration with the same constraint and state assignment).1020
c
(c | s |= A1 ⊓ A2)
ǫ
−→ (c | s |= A1)
c
(c | s |= A1 ⊓ A2)
ǫ
−→ (c | s |= A2)
(A.4)
The treatment of parallelism is more subtle. We introduce a new form of action
par s | x • A to record a local state s of the parallel action A, with write control over
the variables in x . The first transition rule for a parallelism defines a silent transition
that rewrites it in terms of this new construct.1025
The rule below allows evolutions of the first parallel action A1 that are either silent
or do not involve a channel in the synchronisation set to be reflected in the parallelism.
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A similar omitted rule considers independent evolutions of A2.
(c | s1 |= A1)
l
−→ (c3 | s3 |= A3) l = ǫ ∨ chan l < cs

c | s
|=
(par s1 | x1 • A1)
JcsK
(par s2 | x2 • A2)


l
−→

c3 | s
|=
(par s3 | x1 • A3)
JcsK
(par s2 | x2 • A2)


(A.5)
The next rule is for when the parallel actions can evolve by synchronising. In partic-1030
ular, A1 can carry out an input d?w1, and A2 an output d!w2, where d is a channel in
the synchronisation set, and the values communicated are equal. The transition rule
establishes that, in this case, the parallelism as a whole actually performs an output.
The new constraint records the restriction that w1 = w2.
(c | s1 |= A1)
d?w1
−→ (c3 | s3 |= A3) (c | s2 |= A2)
d!w2
−→ (c4 | s4 |= A4)
d ∈ cs c3 ∧ c4 ∧ w1 = w2

c | s
|=
(par s1 | x1 • A1)
JcsK
(par s2 | x2 • A2)


d!w2
−→

c3 ∧ c4 ∧ w1 = w2 | s
|=
(par s3 | x1 • A3)
JcsK
(par s4 | x2 • A4)


(A.6)
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Similar rules apply when A1 can output and A2 input, or when both A1 and A2 can
output. When they can both input, the parallelism also performs an input.
Perhaps the most interesting rule is the one that applies when both parallel actions
have terminated. In this case, the parallelism terminates.
c

c | s
|=
(par s1 | x1 • Skip)
JcsK
(par s2 | x2 • Skip)


ǫ
−→ (c | (∃ x′2 • s1) ∧ (∃ x
′
1 • s2) |= Skip)
(A.7)
1040
The state after the parallelism is defined by composing the local states of the parallel
actions. We keep from the local state s1 of the first action only the changes to the
variables in its name set x1. This is achieved by hiding (quantifying) the final value of
the variables in the complement set x2. The same applies to s2. The conjunction of the
quantifications defines the new state. We observe that, alternatively, we can define the1045
new state as s1; end x2 ∧ s2; end x1.
Rules for external choice require similar considerations. Actions in an external
choice can evolve independently, with local access to all variables, until the choice is
made, and consequently, the local changes become global. The new form of action
(loc c | s • A1) ⊞ (loc c | s • A2) records the initial state locally.1050
c
(c | s |= A1 @ A2)
ǫ
−→ (c | s |= (loc c | s • A1) ⊞ (loc c | s • A2))
(A.8)
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Termination can resolve the choice.
c1
(c | s |= (loc c1 | s1 • Skip) ⊞ (loc c2 | s2 • A))
ǫ
−→ (c1 | s1 |= Skip)
(A.9)
Since external choice is commutative, similar rules apply for each of the actions in the
choice. We present just one of the two rules in each case. The next rule establishes that1055
silent transitions do not resolve the choice.
(c1 | s1 |= A1)
ǫ
−→ (c3 | s3 |= A3)

c | s
|=
(loc c1 | s1 • A1)
⊞
(loc c2 | s2 • A2)


ǫ
−→

c | s
|=
(loc c3 | s3 • A3)
⊞
(loc c2 | s2 • A2)


(A.10)
An event, however, does resolve the choice.
(c1 | s1 |= A1)
l
−→ (c3 | s3 |= A3) l , ǫ
(c | s |= (loc c1 | s1 • A1) ⊞ (loc c2 | s2 • A2))
l
−→ (c3 | s3 |= A3)
(A.11)
For a hiding A1 \ cs, the rules allow evolution of A1 to lead to evolution of the hiding1060
itself. In the rule below, evolution does not involve a hidden channel, so the label for
the hiding transition is that for the A1 transition.
(c1 | s1 |= A1)
l
−→ (c2 | s2 |= A2) chan l < cs
(c1 | s1 |= A1 \ cs)
l
−→ (c2 | s2 |= A2 \ cs)
(A.12)
If, on the other hand, A1 can communicate on a hidden channel, the corresponding
evolution of the hiding is silent.1065
(c1 | s1 |= A1)
l
−→ (c2 | s2 |= A2) l = ǫ ∨ chan l ∈ cs
(c1 | s1 |= A1 \ cs)
ǫ
−→ (c2 | s2 |= A2 \ cs)
(A.13)
An omitted rule specifies that if A1 terminates, so does the hiding.
Appendix B. Emergency Response System
In this appendix, we include another example to illustrate the approach proposed
in this paper. We consider the Emergency Response System (ERS), introduced in [77].
Targets, that is, incidents requiring emergency response, are identified by callers, that1070
is, members of the public, using the ERS and a set of operationally independent sub-
systems, such as Phone System, Radio System, Call Center, and Emergency Response
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Unit (ERU). The ERS must ensure that every call should be sent to the correct tar-
get. More details about the ERS can be found in [78]. It is used in [52] to assess the
deadlock detection of a prototype model checker for Circus.1075
The Circus specification in Figure B.20 models a subset of the ERU, focusing on
the behavior of an emergency response unit manager, specified by the process ERU ,
and of a caller, process InitiateRescueOrFault . The latter sends rescue service re-
quests to the ERU and can trigger a message-drop fault, to be detected and treated by
a fault-recovery component, specified by a process Recovery omitted here.1080
All three processes run concurrently and synchronise on the sets of channels indi-
cated in the definition of their parallel composition. In broad terms, the ERU process
manages the amount of available and allocated response units. InitiateRescueOrFault
asks for idle units and the ERU allocates them accordingly. If a fault is triggered,
Recovery logs the occurrence and resend the dropped message to the manager.1085
This example illustrates mutations that may affect concurrency. The operators
ppoParSeq and ppoParInt are applicable in this context and yield interesting results
that we discuss in the following sections.
Appendix B.1. Mutations by ppoParInt
The mutation operator ppoParInt replaces a parallel composition with an inter-1090
leaving, causing the concurrent execution to take place without synchronization be-
tween the processes. For this example, this operator can be applied in both parallel
compositions to yield the mutants shown in Figure B.21.
Both mutants can be killed by test cases based on the fact that the minimal ac-
ceptance set for the original ERSystem after the empty trace contains only the event1095
start rescue. Other events available due to the mutation are forbidden continuations.
The test cases TT (s , a1) and TF (s ,X ) below are based on the empty trace s = 〈〉,
forbidden continuation a1 = start recovery , and acceptance set X = {start rescue}.
TT (s , a1) = pass → start recovery → fail → Stop
TF (s ,X ) = fail → start rescue → pass → Stop
They can both be used to kill ppoParIntERSystem1 and ppoParIntERSystem2.
Appendix B.2. Mutations by ppoParSeq1100
The parallel composition in the definition of ERSystem is changed to a sequential
composition by the concurrency mutation operator ppoParSeq . The result of the mu-
tation is shown in Figure B.22. In the two produced mutants, the first process of the
resulting sequential composition has a non-terminating looping behavior: both ERU
and InitiateRescueOrFault are non-terminating. This makes the second process in the1105
sequential composition unreachable. As an strategy to kill the mutants, test cases can
be based on traces that exercise events exclusively available in the unreachable process.
The behavior of the mutant parSeqERSystem1, for example, is restricted to that
defined by InitiateRescueOrFault , at the left of the sequential composition, in par-
allel with Recovery . Such behavior is identical to that of ERSystem while it holds
that allocated < total erus in the ERU process. To expose this, we need a trace to
reach a state in ERSystem where allocated = total erus and check for a forbidden
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process ERU =̂ begin
state Control == [ allocated , total erus : N ]
InitControl == [Control ′ | allocated ′ = 0 ∧ total erus ′ = 5 ]
AllocateState == [∆Control | allocated ′ = allocated + 1 ]
Allocate =̂ allocate idle eru →AllocateState ; Choose
ServiceState == [∆Control | allocated ′ = allocated − 1 ]
Service =̂ service rescue → ServiceState ; Choose
Choose =̂ if ( allocated = 0 )−→Allocate
8 ( allocated = total erus )−→ Service
8 ( allocated > 0 ∧ allocated < total erus )−→
Allocate @ Service
fi
• InitControl ; Choose
end
process InitiateRescueOrFault =̂ begin
CallCentreStart =̂ start rescue → FindIdleEru
FindIdleEru =̂ find idle erus → (IdleEru @ (wait → FindIdleEru))
IdleEru =̂ allocate idle eru → send rescue info to eru → IR1
IR1 =̂ process message → FAReceiveMessage @ fault activation → IR2
FAReceiveMessage =̂ receive message → ServiceRescue
ServiceRescue =̂ service rescue → CallCentreStart
IR2 =̂ IR2Out @ error detection → FAStartRecovery
IR2Out =̂ drop message → target not attended → CallCentreStart
FAStartRecovey =̂ start recovery → end recovery → ServiceRescue
• CallCentreStart
end
channelsetERUSignals == {| allocate idle eru , service rescue |}
channelsetRecoverySignals == {| start recovery , end recovery |}
process ERSystem =̂
(InitiateRescueOrFault J ERUSignals K ERU ) J RecoverySignals K Recovery
Figure B.20: ERS Specification
process ppoParIntERSystem1 =̂
(InitiateRescueOrFault 9 ERU ) J RecoverySignals K Recovery
process ppoParIntERSystem2 =̂
(InitiateRescueOrFault J ERUSignals K ERU ) 9 Recovery
Figure B.21: ppoSeqInt ERSystem mutants
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process parSeqERSystem1 =̂
(InitiateRescueOrFault ; ERU ) J RecoverySignals K Recovery
process parSeqERSystem2 =̂
(InitiateRescueOrFault J ERUSignals K ERU ); Recovery
Figure B.22: Mutations by ppoParSeq
continuation a2 = allocate idle eru and acceptance set X2 = {wait}. Below, we have
a trace s1 of both parSeqERSystem1 and ERSystem .
s1 = 〈start rescue,find idle eru ,
allocate idle eru , send rescue info to eru ,
fault activation , drop message , target not attended〉
InERSystem , in the execution of this trace, the state of the processERU is changed by
increasing in the value of allocated by 1. Such trace can be repeatedly observed in the
execution of ERSystem up to five times, until allocated = total erus , when no more1110
units are available and the minimal acceptance set is a single wait event. The mutant
parSeqERSystem1, on the other hand, is able to perform the forbidden continuation
allocate idle eru and, therefore, can be killed by the test cases below.
TT (s1
5 a 〈start rescue,find idle eru〉, allocate idle eru)
TF (s1
5 a 〈start rescue,find idle eru〉, {wait})
We use s5
1
to represent the trace containing five consecutive copies of s1. We omit the
explicit definition of the above tests due to their size.1115
The mutation inflicted in parSeqERSystem2 removes the Recovery process from
the parallel execution, as it becomes the second part of the sequential composition. So,
the events in this process are absent in the mutant. The following trace
s2 = 〈start rescue,find idle eru , allocate idle eru , send rescue info to eru ,
fault activation , error detection , start recovery〉
is both a trace of parSeqERSystem2 and ERSystem . In ERSystem , however, the next
events are from Recovery , which is not reachable in the mutant parSeqERSystem2.
So, the following tests can kill the mutant.
TT (s2, end recovery) =
inc → start rescue → pass → find idle eru
→ pass → allocate idle eru → pass → send rescue info to eru
→ pass → fault activation → pass → error detection
→ pass → start recovery → pass → end recovery
→ fail → Stop
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TF (s2, {log fault}) =
inc → start rescue → fail → find idle eru
→ fail → allocate idle eru → fail → send rescue info to eru
→ fail → fault activation → fail → error detection
→ fail → start recovery → fail → log fault
→ pass → Stop
Considering the trace s2, we can use the forbidden continuaton end recovery and the
minimal acceptance set {log fault} to obtain the tests shown above.1120
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